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THE MATURE PRODUCT PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE:
THE UNITARY STANDARD AND THE
PARADOX OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION
Jean MacchiaroliEggent
INTRODUCTION

The product preemption doctrine' is reaching maturity with all the
awkwardness of a hundred-year-old adolescent.2 The history of
modern product preemption doctrine has been characterized by
inconsistency and paradox,3 and attorneys anticipate each new
decision of the United States Supreme Court with a mixture of hope
for a definitive test and preparedness for new battles in an
increasingly confusing landscape.4 To date, the Supreme Court's
t Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; member, Widener Health Law
Institute. The author would like to thank Laura Ray and John Culhane for reading and
commenting on earlier drafts of this article.
I use the term "product preemption doctrine" to refer to the rules and processes of
preemption set forth in a series of U.S. Supreme Court product liability cases. Non-product
cases and non-tort cases also have informed the product preemption doctrine, and to that extent,
I include discussion of those cases in this Article. This Article focuses primarily, though not
exclusively, on the Court's jurisprudence addressing whether state-law product liability claims
should be preempted by federal law.
2 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed preemption in its decisions for this
length of time, product preemption is a newer adjunct to the traditional doctrine.
3 See, e.g., DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILffY LAw § 14.4, at 896 (2005) (stating
that the preemption doctrine "continues to wallow in a state of utter chaos"); Viet D. Dinh,
Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000) (stating that "the Supreme
Court's numerous preemption cases follow no predictable jurisprudential or analytical pattern");
Allison H. Eid, Preemption and the Federalism Five, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 8 (2005) (observing
that "the pro-federalism Justices in the New Federalism cases find themselves, more often than
not, on the pro-preemption side in the preemption cases"); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak
Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 559-60 (1997)
(stating that "there is no better illustration of the Court's schizophrenia than in the area of
federal preemption of state tort remedies").
4 See Martina Barash & Julie Steinberg, Preemption Tops Key Litigation Issues Heading
Into New Year, 24 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 120, 120-21 (2009) (recognizing the unpredictability
of the Supreme Court's next decision, in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009)).
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product preemption jurisprudence has failed to produce an optimal
level of certainty and predictability in an area of the law dedicated to
consumer protection.
An important segment of the Court's product preemption
jurisprudence has involved medical devices and drugs regulated under
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).5 In fact, two of the
Court's three important preemption decisions in 2008 and 2009 have
involved aspects of regulation under the FDCA. Products generally,
and medical devices and drugs in particular, involve a complex set of
policies relating to public health and safety, areas traditionally within
the police power of the states. Federal product regulation also
overlaps with state common law. One has only to look at the recent
Vioxx debacle to see the problems that can result when a
resource-stressed Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is hindered in
providing necessary product oversight.6 In the thousands of lawsuits
that alleged illness or death associated with Vioxx use, the
manufacturer, Merck & Co., argued that the plaintiffs' tort claims
were preempted because the FDA approved the drug for marketing.
The delicate balance between these kinds of product liability claims,
which ultimately establish standards of conduct, and FDA regulation,
which serves other goals as well,8 presents a special challenge in
preemption analysis. Focusing on cases involving the FDCA,
therefore, provides insight into the most pressing problems raised by
the Court's product preemption doctrine.

5

21 U.S.C.A §§ 301-395 (West 2009).
See Jonathan V. O'Steen & Van O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the Argument
Against Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective Drugs, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 67-68 (2006) (describing the FDA's failure to act on the dangers of Vioxx,
despite the numerous warning signs of the drug's dangerous side effects).
7 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 788-89 (E.D. La. 2007)
(holding that plaintiffs' product liability claims were not preempted); McDarby v. Merck & Co.,
949 A.2d 223, 251 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (holding that plaintiffs' tort claims were not
preempted), cert. granted, 960 A.2d 393 (N.J. 2008).
8 The FDA defines its task as follows:
6

The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety,
efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical
devices, our nation's food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.
The FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed
innovations that make medicines and foods more effective, safer, and more
affordable; and helping the public get the accurate, science-based information they
need to use medicines and foods to improve their health.
U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Mission Statement, http://www.fda.gov/opacom/more
choices/mission.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter FDA Mission Statement]. Thus,
the FDA must balance consumer safety with speed in making needed therapeutic innovations
available to the public.
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Now that the product preemption doctrine is entering its maturity
with the recent triad of Supreme Court decisions,9 it is useful to
reassess the doctrine. This Article undertakes that task and reaches
some disappointing conclusions from the perspective of consumer
safety. In an earlier article, I argued that the Court's product
preemption doctrine embodies certain norms and rules, including the
value of consumer protection.' 0 As the doctrine has matured,
however, there is a disconnect between those goals and the analytical
process by which the Court reaches its decisions on preemption. The
mature doctrine is not easily discernible from the collection of
individual cases. Rather, it must be understood as a kind of gestalt,
which presents itself as something other than the sum of its individual
parts. Thus, even in cases in which the result reached by the Court on
preemption advances consumer protection goals, the underlying
process used by the Court may establish a precedent that will
jeopardize those goals in future cases. The doctrine is a double-edged
sword, wielded in the interest of consumer protection, but just as
capable of mortally wounding that goal in a broad sweep.
Part I of this Article begins by briefly reviewing some of the
decisions that defined the Supreme Court's product preemption
doctrine prior to 2008. This section focuses primarily on the often
irreconcilable inconsistencies among the cases and the resulting
confusion over the standards they embody. Part II considers the
overriding concerns of product safety and consumer protection that
form the basis of most of product law, both in regulation and in the
common law. Particular attention is given to the challenges faced by
the FDA in making accurate decisions on the safety and effectiveness
of drugs and medical devices as the agency struggles with insufficient
resources and increasing demands. Part Ell of this Article presents a
critical analysis of the triad of product preemption cases that the
Court decided in 2008 and 2009, and demonstrates what these
decisions add to the development of the doctrine. Armed with this
new information, I argue in Part IV that the mature product
preemption doctrine has become a unitary standard, merging
previously discrete analytical elements into a single process. Finally,
Part V argues that the unitary standard poses a threat to the health and
9 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct.
538 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). The Court had an opportunity to
decide another product preemption case, but the case resulted in a 4-to-4 tie. See
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168, 1168 (2008) (per curiam) (letting stand a Second
Circuit decision that federal drug law does not preempt the fraud exception to a state statute
immunizing prescription drug manufacturers from lawsuits).
10 See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Normalization of Product Preemption Doctrine, 57
ALA. L. REv. 725, 752-54 (2006) [hereinafter Eggen, Normalization of ProductPreemption].
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safety goals of product liability law, particularly in an era when the
FDA is unable to fully and effectively execute its role in product
safety. This Article concludes that although consumer interests may
have been served in many of the Court's preemption cases, the
potential for arbitrary and policy-laden decisions is great.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCT PREEMPTION DOCTRINE:
CASES AND CONFUSION

Prior to 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued a number of
important decisions on the product preemption doctrine. I do not
intend to survey these decisions in any detail, as they have been
thoroughly surveyed in the past." Rather, in this section I identify and
elucidate the concepts that are significant in the mature doctrine and
demonstrate how the confusion over the analytical standards has
arisen. The doctrine of preemption is derived from the Supremacy
Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.13 The United States
Supreme Court has consistently recognized several types of
preemption, which have fallen into the two broad categories of
express preemption and implied preemption. Express preemption of
state laws may arise when the federal statute or a regulation
promulgated by a federal agency within its statutory authority 4
contains a preemption provision that sets forth the circumstances
under which state rules will be barred.' 5 Implied preemption may
occur in several ways. First, Congress may have intended a particular
II See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by FederalSafety Statutes:
Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 940-66 (2004);
Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967,
974-1012 (2002); Eggen, Normalizationof Product Preemption, supra note 10, at 728-50; Jean
Macchiaroli Eggen, Shedding Light on the Preemption Doctrine in Product Liability Actions:
Defining the Scope of Buckman and Sprietsma, 6 DEL. L. REV. 143, 144-62, 168-73 (2003)
[hereinafter Eggen, Shedding Light]; Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Sense or Sensibility?: Toxic
Product Liability Under State Law After Cipollone and Medtronic, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1,
6-11 (1997) [hereinafter Eggen, Sense or Sensibility]; M. Stuart Madden, FederalPreemption
of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations,21 PACE L. REv. 103, 111-57 (2000); David G. Owen,
FederalPreemptionof ProductsLiability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411, 422-37 (2003).
12U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663 (1993) ("Where a state
statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the former must give way."); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("[flt has been settled that state law that conflicts
with federal law is 'without effect.'"); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)
(discussing the Supremacy Clause and asserting that "[i]t is basic to this constitutional command
that all conflicting state provisions be without effect").
14 See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
("Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.").
1" See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("[W]hen Congress has
unmistakably . .. ordained' that its enactments alone are to regulate a part of commerce, state
laws regulating that aspect of commerce must fall." (citation omitted)).
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statutory scheme to "occupy the field" on the subject in question. If
so, "[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it."1 6 Second, state laws may be preempted
because there is an actual conflict between them and the federal
statute in one of two ways.17 Conflict preemption may occur when it
is impossible to comply with both the federal statute or regulation and
the state-law rules' or when state law is an obstacle to the
achievement of the goals of the federal scheme.9
Another fixture in the preemption landscape has been the so-called
presumption against preemption. This presumption, which derives
from the Supremacy Clause, holds that "the historic police powers of
the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 2 0 This definition of
the presumption against preemption is particularly apt in the context
of products involving health and safety issues. What has not been
clear from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, however, is why the
presumption is rejected-or ignored-in some cases where it would
otherwise seem applicable.21
The perceived dichotomy between express preemption and implied
preemption-and the notions that they are invoked under different
circumstances and involve different analytical processes-has driven
much of the legal system's understanding of product preemption. To
be sure, the Supreme Court has typically dealt with express
preemption and implied preemption as separate processes. But these
16Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Field preemption is rarely a
factor and is usually not discussed in the product preemption cases, except to indicate that
comprehensiveness of regulations does not necessarily mean that Congress meant to occupy the
field. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985)
(stating that the Court is reluctant to infer field preemption from comprehensive federal
statutory provisions or administrative regulations). This Article does not treat field preemption
because that type of implied preemption has not been an issue in the Court's product preemption
doctrine. Cf Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 68-69 (2002) (conducting one of the
only analyses in the product preemption line of cases that address whether the statutory scheme
was intended to occupy the field and concluding that it was not).
17 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983).
18 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) ("A
holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable . . . where compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility. . . .").
19 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (stating that the Court's primary
function in preemption analysis is to determine whether state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress").
2o Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
21 Compare Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870-71 (2000) (refusing to
apply the presumption against preemption), with Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543
(2008) (recognizing that the presumption against preemption applies in both the express and
implied preemption contexts).
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processes have often seemed at cross purposes, and the rules the
Court has followed have appeared inconsistent. In particular, the
relationship between express preemption and implied preemption, and
the extent to which either or both are involved in a given case, have
often flummoxed Court observers and confounded courts attempting
to apply the doctrines.
Comparing several Supreme Court cases demonstrates the breadth
of this problem. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,22 the Court was
called upon to interpret the language in the express preemption
provisions of two federal cigarette labeling statutes establishing
mandatory health warnings on cigarette packages and elsewhere.23
The underlying action was a product liability suit brought by the
estate of a smoker.24 The Cipollone Court conducted a detailed
examination of the scope of the preemption provisions in the two
statutes. The Court first held that the language in the 1965 preemption
provision was not intended to preempt state common-law suits, and
then further held that Congress intended the provision in the 1969 Act
to preempt at least some state tort claims.25 The Court's analysis
centered around the intent of Congress in changing the language of
the 1969 provision to bar state-law "requirements" based upon the
advertising and promotion of cigarettes.26 The Court held that
Congress intended the term "requirements" to include at least some
common-law claims.2 7 In a plurality opinion written by Justice
Stevens-a frequent author of subsequent product preemption
decisions for the Court-the Court ultimately held that the
failure-to-warn claims were preempted, but that the breach of express
warranty claim and the misrepresentation claims based upon a general
duty not to deceive under state law were not preempted.28
505 U.S. 504 (1992).
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2006)); Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1340
(2006)).
24 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 512 (plurality opinion) (listing the claims relevant to the Court's
decision as failure to warn, breach of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and
conspiracy to defraud).
2 Id. at 522. The focus of the Court's analysis was the change in language from a
prohibition of any "statement relating to smoking and health," as stated in the 1965 preemption
provision, to preemption of any "requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health," as
stated in the 1969 provision. Id. at 514-15 (discussing the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1965, § 5(a), and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 5(b)).
2 Id. at 520-23. The claims held not preempted were deemed to be requirements that
were (1) not "imposed under State law," (2) not "with respect to the advertising or promotion"
of cigarettes, or (3) not "based on smoking and health," all of which the preemption provision
required. Id. at 525-30.
2 Id. at 524-29.
23

n Id.
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The Cipollone Court suggested that because the cigarette labeling
acts contained express preemption provisions, only express
preemption analysis was appropriate. Thus, the Court stated: "In our
opinion, the pre-emptive scope of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act is
governed entirely by the express language" therein. 29 Furthermore,
the Court reasoned that when an express preemption provision
"provides a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to
state authority"'-in other words, where Congress clearly indicated
what kinds of state rules were barred-the provision absolutely
30
governs on matters of preemption.
In 1996, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,3 1 the Court closely followed
the approach outlined in Cipollone for preemption analysis in cases in
32
which the federal statute contains an express preemption provision.
Lohr involved a different statute, one encompassing major health and
safety decisions impacting most members of the general public. 3 3 The
claims asserted in the case involved an allegedly defective cardiac
pacemaker lead, a Class M medical device 34 that had been granted
29 Id. at 517; cf. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (stating,
in a non-product liability case, that "[a]bsent explicit pre-emptive language," an implied
preemption analysis would be appropriate). Cipollone appeared to be a compromise decision in
that the Court held that some, but not all, of the plaintiffs claims were preempted. The decision
thus spawned two partial dissents, one from Justice Scalia and one from Justice Blackmun. Both
partial dissents assumed that the plurality's position was that express preemption was the only
analysis to be conducted when the statute contains a preemption provision. Calling this point
one of the "new rules" he thought the plurality was announcing on preemption, Justice Scalia
observed with disapproval: "Once there is an express pre-emption provision, in other words, all
doctrines of implied pre-emption are eliminated." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 547 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun, however, approved of the
plurality's apparent position, stating: "We resort to principles of implied pre-emption ... only
when Congress has been silent with respect to pre-emption." Id. at 532 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, the position of a majority of the Court appeared
to be that the existence of an express preemption provision circumscribed the preemption
analysis and foreclosed implied preemption. This, of course, proved not to be the case.
* Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505
(1978)).
31 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
32 See Eggen, Sense or Sensibility, supra note 11, at 27-28.
33When it enacted the first cigarette labeling act, Congress stated: "It is the policy of the
Congress, and the purpose of this Act, to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal
with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health . . . ." Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 2, 79
Stat. 282, 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)). The purpose of the legislation,
however, was information communication. Its safety concerns were limited to communication
of warnings to the general public in the form of packaging and advertising. Furthermore,
Congress clearly stated that the act was intended to protect the economic interests of the tobacco
industry. See id. § 2(2)(A) (stating that a goal of the act was to ensure that "commerce and the
national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared
policy"). The FDCA, as amended, which was invoked in Lohr, was instead largely concerned
with health and safety determinations in the first instance.
3 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2006). Class I1l
devices are those used for "supporting or sustaining human life or .. . preventing impairment of
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marketing approval pursuant to section 510k of the Medical Device
Amendments 35 (MDA) of the FDCA. Section 510k permitted the
FDA to allow marketing of a Class III device upon a finding that the
device was the "substantial equivalent" of a device on the market
prior to the enactment of the MDA.36
The Court applied the preemption provision in the MDA, which
states that "no State . . . may establish or continue in effect with

respect to a device intended for human use any requirement .. . which
is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
[the FDCA] to the device, and . . . which relates to the safety or
In addition to the statutory
effectiveness of the device . . . .

language, the Court relied upon an FDA regulation interpreting the
preemption provision.38 The Court remained very close to the text of
the MDA's preemption provision in its analysis, ultimately
concluding, for a variety of reasons, that none of the plaintiffs'
product liability claims were preempted. 39 The Court did not proceed
to conduct an implied preemption analysis, which was also consistent
with Cipollone.
More than a decade after Cipollone, the Court, in Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences L.L.C.,40 seemed to reaffirm the same approach. Bates
involved the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
human health," or those that "present[] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury." Id. §
360c(a)(1)(C)(ii). Thus, they present the greatest risk to human safety and health.
3 Id. § 360k (originally enacted as the Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-78, Title III, §
302, 76 Stat. 794, and amended by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-295, § 4, 90 Stat. 539, 579).
36 See id. § 360c(i).
3 Id. § 360k(a).
38 The regulation states, in pertinent part:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the [FDA] has established
specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to
a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or
local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the
specific [FDA] requirements.
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2009). The Court followed the regulation closely in determining whether
the MDA and its regulations constituted "requirements," whether they established "counterpart
regulations" that were specific to the device in question, whether any state requirements were
"different from or in addition to" any federal requirements, and whether the state-law claims
were "requirements applicable to the device." The Court answered most of those questions in
the negative. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 493 (1996) (stating that the FDA did
not "require" the product to be designed in any particular way); id. at 495 (holding that any
claims alleging violation of state requirements that paralleled federal requirements were not
preempted); id. at 501 (holding that the federal manufacturing and labeling requirements were
generic in nature and not specific to particular devices); idL (stating that state
common-law duties of general applicability are not "requirements applicable to the device").
3 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493-502.
- 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
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(FIFRA),4 1 which also contains a preemption provision. Dow, the
manufacturer of the pesticide Strongarm, had brought a declaratory
judgment action against farmers complaining of crop damage to
determine whether the doctrine of preemption barred any claims for
property damage that the farmers might bring.43 The farmers
counterclaimed for their damages, asserting claims for strict liability,
negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of a state
consumer protection statute." Employing only an express preemption
analysis, the Court held that most of the petitioner-farmers' claims
were not preempted.45 The Court once again remained silent on
implied preemption. More to the point, all nine Justices appeared to
accept the proposition that, at least in that case, it was inappropriate to
consider anything but express preemption. Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, wrote in partial dissent: "Because we need only
determine the ordinary meaning of [the preemption provision], the
majority rightly declines to address respondent's argument that
petitioners' claims are subject to other types of pre-emption.""
Moreover, Justice Thomas opined that the approach taken by the
majority "comports with this Court's increasing reluctance to expand
federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of implied
preemption." 47
A brief look at some of the product preemption decisions
intervening between Cipollone and Bates suggests that Justice
Thomas's assessment was not quite accurate. In FreightlinerCorp. v.
Myrick, Justice Thomas himself wrote for the Court and applied first
an express preemption analysis and then implied preemption
principles to hold that the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted. 4 8
41 7
42

U.S.C. § 136v (2006).

Id. § 136v(a)(b). The preemption provision states:

A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in
the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use
prohibited by this subchapter. ... Such State shall not impose or continue in effect
any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those
required under this subchapter.
Id.
Bates, 544 U.S. at 435.
Id. at 435-36.
See id. at 444-45. The Court held that the claims for defective design and manufacture,
negligent testing, and breach of express warranty were not preempted. Id. at 444. The Court also
held that the failure-to-warn claims were not preempted to the extent that they claimed violation
of state standards that were parallel to those imposed under FIFRA. Id. at 447 (remanding to the
Fifth Circuit the question whether Texas's common-law duties are equivalent to FIFRA's
misbranding standards).
46 Id. at 458 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47 Id. at 459.
48 514 U.S. 280 (1995) (considering allegations that the absence of an antilock braking
43
44
45
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The case involved the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966,49 which contained both a preemption provision and a saving
clause that recognized the continued validity of state law. The saving
clause provided that "[clompliance with any Federal motor vehicle
safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any
person from any liability under common law."50 The Court first
determined that the express preemption provision, which barred state
law "[wihenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . . is in

effect" with respect to "the same aspect of performance," 5 did not
preempt the plaintiffs' product liability claims because no federal
standard existed at the time of the plaintiffs' accidents.52
The inquiry did not end there, for the Court went on to apply
principles of implied preemption. Justice Thomas stated:
The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of
a statute "implies"-i.e., supports a reasonable inferencethat Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does
not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any
possibility of implied pre-emption. . . . Our subsequent

decisions have not read Cipollone to obviate the need for
analysis of an individual statute's pre-emptive effects.

. .

. At

best, Cipollone supports an inference that an express
pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does
not establish a rule.
At least eight Justices concurred in this view.M The Court's implied
preemption analysis in Myrick was less than probing, with the Court
ultimately rejecting preemption. 5 The Court never took up the
question of the role of the saving clause because it rejected
preemption for other reasons. 6 In all, the process used by the Court in
conducting its preemption analyses in Myrick raised questions about
the circumstances under which the "inference" that a preemption

system in tractor-trailers constituted a negligent design defect).
4 15 U.S.C. §§1391-1431 (1988) (repealed 1994).
5o Id. § 1397(k) (repealed 1994).
51Id. § 1392(d) (repealed 1994).
52 Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 (noting that the suspension of truck and trailer braking
standards created an absence of regulation in that area).
5

Id. at 288-89 (citations omitted).

The judgment was unanimous. Justice Scalia concurred without a written opinion, so he
did not offer a detailed view on this point. Id at 290 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
5 See id. at 289-90.
5 See id. at 287 n.3.
5
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provision "forecloses implied preemption" may in fact yield to an
implied preemption analysis.
A more puzzling departure from Cipollone and Lohr occurred in
2000. When the Supreme Court decided Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co.,5 the continued vitality of Cipollone and Lohr was
questioned. The confusion surrounding Geier arose primarily from
two analytical points. First, even though the relevant federal statute
contained an express preemption provision and a saving clause-and
the Court determined that the plaintiff's personal injury claims were
not expressly preempted 58-the Court held that the claims were
impliedly preempted because state tort law created an actual conflict
with the federal standard. In Myrick, the Court had determined that
the plaintiffs' claims were not impliedly preempted; but in Geier, the
Court conducted a full-blown implied preemption analysis and held
the claims preempted. Second, the Court refused to apply the
presumption against preemption,a leaving unclear-and in
jeopardy-the role of the presumption in implied preemption cases.
In the immediate aftermath of Geier, commentators criticized the
decision as being bereft of any clear analytical principles.6 1
Geier arose from a motor vehicle accident that raised the question
whether the car was defective because it had not been equipped with a
driver's-side airbag. The plaintiffs' product liability claims alleged
negligent and defective design of the automobile. The relevant federal
regulation, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208,62 established
a gradual phase-in scheme for passive restraints, but did not require
automobile manufacturers to install particular passive restraints, such

529 U.S. 861 (2000).
Id. at 868 (finding "no convincing indication that Congress wanted to preempt, not only
state statutes and regulations, but also common-law tort actions").
59 Id. at 874 (holding that the common-law "no airbag" action conflicts with the federal
standard, FMVSS 208).
6o See id. at 870 (finding "nothing in the natural reading of the two provisions that would
favor one set of policies over the other"). Justice Breyer's statements about the presumption
against preemption were far from clear. See Eggen, Normalization of Product Preemption,
supra note 10, at 757.
61 See, e.g., Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand: Did Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co. Eradicatethe PresumptionAgainst Preemption?, 17 BYU J. PUB.
L. 1, 2 (2002); Stacey Allen Carroll, Note, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability
Claims: Adding Clarityand Respect for State Sovereignty to the Analysis of Federal Preemption
Defenses, 36 GA. L. REv. 797, 819-28 (2002); Alexander K. Haas, Note, Chipping Away at
State Tort Remedies Through Pre-Emption Jurisprudence: Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co., 89 CAL. L. REv. 1927, 1943-47 (2001).
62 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2009). This standard was promulgated pursuant to the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (2000)). The Act was the same statute involved in
Myrick.
5
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as airbags, in their vehicles.63 The authorizing statute contained both
an express preemption provision and a saving clause. After
determining that the express preemption provision did not preempt
the plaintiffs' claims," the Geier Court proceeded to consider
whether the claims were impliedly preempted. Stating that "[n]othing
in the language of the saving clause suggests an intent to save
state-law tort actions that conflict with federal regulations," 65 the
66
Court held that conflict preemption barred the plaintiffs' claims.
Geier was also significant because the Court directly addressed the
role of the saving clause in the preemption analysis. The Court
insisted that it had assumed in earlier preemption cases that principles
of conflict preemption may still apply when the relevant statute
contains a saving clause. 67 The circumstances that would cause a
court to relegate the saving clause to an advisory, rather than
mandatory, status would occur when state law "'would upset the
careful regulatory scheme established by federal law."' 6 8 In this case,
the Court determined that such a situation existed and held the
plaintiffs claims preempted 69 notwithstanding the saving clause.
The Court followed Geier's approach in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'
Legal Committee,70 another case involving the MDA. This time,
however, the Court largely ignored the MDA's preemption provision,
which had been so focal in the Lohr decision. In Buckman, the
plaintiffs' claims took the form of allegations that the manufacturer of
the section 510k "substantially equivalent" medical device involved
in the case-a bone screw that had been used in spinal surgery-had
6 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2009). The Department of Transportation (DOT) had rejected a
provision that would have required manufacturers to equip their vehicles with airbags. Instead,
the standard gave manufacturers a choice among the types of passive restraints available. The
DOT's goal was to phase in the passive-restraint requirement over a period of several years. See
Geier, 529 U.S. at 878-79. The standard contained a non-mandatory incentive to install airbags.
Id. at 879-80.
6 Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 (stating that there was "no convincing indication that Congress
wanted to pre-empt, not only state statutes and regulations, but also common-law tort actions").
65 Id. at 869.
66 Id. at 886.
67 See id. at 870. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, stated:

Neither do we believe that the pre-emption provision, the saving provision, or both
together, create some kind of "special burden" beyond that inherent in ordinary
pre-emption principles-which "special burden" would specially disfavor
pre-emption here. The two provisions, read together, reflect a neutral policy, not a
specially favorable or unfavorable policy, toward the application of ordinary conflict
pre-emption principles.
Id. at 870-71 (citation omitted).
6 Id. at 870 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000)).
6 Id. at 873.
70 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
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committed fraud on the FDA in its application for 510k marketing
approval.7 ' The Court held that principles of implied preemption
barred the claims because the FDCA contained a unique federal
scheme for addressing fraudulent practices perpetrated against the
FDA. The federal scheme for policing fraud on the FDA,n the Court
reasoned, embodied substantial federal interests in its comprehensive
set of regulations and reflected the uniquely federal nature of the
relationship between the manufacturer and the FDA. 73 In its analysis,
the Court completely ignored express preemption, notwithstanding
the provision contained in the MDA.7 4 In so doing, the Court seemed
to view the claims-and policies-involved in Buckman as distinct
from those involved in Lohr in some way that justified different
treatment. But beyond that, little could be discerned of the Court's
preemption doctrine.
If Geier and Buckman were not confounding enough, the Court
decided Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine75 in 2002. Sprietsma added
nothing but further confusion to the general understanding in the legal
community about the parameters and process of the product
preemption doctrine. The Court was called upon to determine whether
a plaintiffs product liability claims, arising from a motor boat
accident in which the plaintiffs decedent was struck by a propeller,
were preempted. The plaintiff claimed that the boat should have
been equipped with a propeller guard, notwithstanding that the
manufacturer was in compliance with the Federal Boat Safety Act of
1971 (FBSA).n The authority to promulgate boat safety regulations
fell upon the United States Coast Guard, which had declined to
require propeller guards on motor boats. The FBSA contained both
an express preemption provision 79 and a saving clause.80 The Court
71 Id. at 347 (claiming that "petitioner and AcroMed made fraudulent representations to
the FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws and that, as a result, the devices were
improperly given market clearance").
72 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (criminal penalties for material false statements to
the government); 21 U.S.C. § 332 (2006) (authorizing injunctive relief); id. § 333(a)
(authorizing criminal sanctions); id. § 333(g) (authorizing civil penalties); id. § 372 (granting
the FDA the power to investigate fraudulent practices).
7 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347-48. Much of the Buckman opinion discussed the "delicate
balance of statutory objectives" in the MDA in which Congress envisioned a clear role for the
federal agency in policing fraud. Id. at 348. For further discussion of this point, see Eggen,
Shedding Light, supra note 11, at 157-59.
74 The Court made a single direct reference to the provision in a footnote, stating: "In light
of [our] conclusion, we express no view on whether these claims are subject to express
pre-emption under 21 U.S.C. § 360k." Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348 n.2.

- 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
76

Id. at 54.

" 46 U.S.C.
78
7

§ 4301-4311 (2006).

Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 62.
46 U.S.C. § 4306 ("Unless permitted by the Secretary

...

a State or political
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conducted an express preemption analysis and determined that the
plaintiff's claims were not preempted because Congress did not
intend state common-law actions to fall within the provision.8 ' The
Court then proceeded to conduct an implied preemption analysis,
concluding that the claims were not impliedly preempted either. 82
If the ultimate holdings in Buckman and Sprietsma made some
sense, the Court's approach to preemption in those cases did nothing
to clear up the confusion over the operation of the doctrine; the result
was a serious lack of predictability and a perception that no set
standards applied. One could reasonably wonder what had become
of the statement in Cipollone, followed to the letter in Lohr, that when
the federal statute contains an express preemption provision, the
preemption analysis is "governed entirely by the express language" of
the provision.8 Further confounding the effort to understand the
process was the appearance of Bates85 in 2005, which reverted to the
Cipollone-Lohr express preemption principles.8 6
As the decisions have demonstrated, other contradictory matters
have further complicated efforts to apply the doctrine with any
consistency. For example, the Court has explicitly applied a
presumption against preemption in some circumstances, 87 but firmly
rejected its application in others.8 8 The lack of clear parameters on the
application of the presumption against preemption has amplified the

subdivision of a State may not establish . . . a law or regulation . . . that is not identical to a

regulation prescribed under section 4302 of this title.").
so Id. § 4311(g) ("Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders
prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under
State law.").
1 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63-64.
82 Id. at 67-70. The Court included a field preemption analysis, but rejected preemption
on that ground. See id. at 68-69.
83 See sources cited supra note 3.
8 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992).
85 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
86See supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518 (stating that the express preemption provisions in
the cigarette labeling acts must be construed "in light of the presumption against the
pre-emption of state police power regulations"); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947) (acknowledging "the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that (is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress").
88 See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-48 (2001)
(rejecting application of the presumption against preemption in the context of the unique and
inherently federal interest in policing fraud against the FDA). In Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., Justice Breyer's language rejecting "some kind of 'special burden"' disfavoring
preemption, 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000), has been broadly read as rejecting the presumption
against preemption. But cf Eggen, Normalization of Product Preemption, supra note 10, at 758
(arguing that Justice Breyer's concurrence in Lohr indicated his adherence to the presumption
against preemption and that the language in Geier should be read narrowly).
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confusion. 89 Furthermore, the role of a saving clause in the
preemption analysis has not been fully explored in the cases. In a
separate, but equally relevant issue, the Court has sometimes
expressly acknowledged the value of state tort actions in the federal
regulatory context, even while preempting them,90 but at other times
has disparaged them.9 1 In this climate of uncertainty, the product
preemption decisions of 2008 and 2009 were eagerly anticipated.
II. ADVANCING CONSUMER SAFETY THROUGH FEDERAL
REGULATION AND STATE TORT LAW

Most of modem product law involves the health and safety of
consumers.92 A moral imperative is therefore often at the basis of
product decisions. As Professor David G. Owen has stated: "By
choosing to expose product users and others to certain types and
degrees of risk, manufacturers appropriate to themselves certain
interests in safety and bodily integrity that may belong to those other
persons.

. . . At bottom,

product

accidents

are moral-not

93

technological-events." This fact distinguishes product regulation
from many other kinds of regulation, which may focus on a variety of
other social goals. 94 The product preemption doctrine must be viewed
in this broader public health context, even when other goals enter into
the mix. 95
89 For a discussion of the presumption against preemption and an analysis of the Court's
approach up to and including Bates, see Eggen, Normalization of Product Preemption, supra
note 10, at 754-63 (arguing that the presumption against preemption has had continued vitality
notwithstanding the Court's refusal to apply it in some cases). For a discussion of how the Court
has once again proclaimed the importance of the presumption, see infra text accompanying note
201. But see generally Davis, supra note 11, at 1013-16 (arguing that Geier and the earlier
cases demonstrated that the Court has abandoned the presumption against preemption).
9 See Geier,529 U.S. at 870 (discussing the saving clause and stating that it "preserves
those actions that seek to establish greater safety than the minimum safety achieved by a federal
regulation intended to provide a floor").
91See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350 (expressing concern that allowing state tort actions for
fraud on the FDA would deter companies from developing potentially beneficial medical
devices).
92 See DAN. B. DOBBs, THE LAW OF TORTs § 352, at 970 (2000) (stating that "[tihe focus
[of product liability law] has been on products that do not meet safety standards or
expectations").
93 OWEN, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 7.
9 For example, the Endangered Species Act focuses on an entirely different set of
priorities-"to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006). Cf Oliver A.
Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 Miss.
L.J. 403 (1994) (arguing that successful environmental regulation takes into account various
alternative approaches).
95 The FDA must balance the need to make drugs and medical devices available to the
public as speedily as possible with the safety and health of the consuming public. See FDA
Mission Statement, supra note 8.
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A complex interaction between federal law and state law is
pervasive in the area of product safety. 96 Matters relating to the health
and safety of the general public are traditionally within the province
of the states.97 Thus, state product liability law evolved9 8 to advance
these goals in the absence of regulation and, later, to supplement
regulation. Most consumer products involve risks as well as
benefits. 99 The choice made by a manufacturer and a regulating
agency to market a particular product in a particular condition
represents a complex analysis of its risks and benefits.'0
Nevertheless, some products marketed to consumers are defective and
unreasonably dangerous in design or manufacture, or because they
contain inadequate warnings.' 0
A related matter is the role of tort litigation in accomplishing the
health and safety goals that are woven into the fabric of federal
product regulations. The tort system has come under criticism in
recent years, and the topic has been hotly debated.10 2 Much of the
anecdotal information about the excesses of the tort system has been
shown to be exaggerated, but some concerns have merit. 0 3 Still, the
United States Supreme Court's product preemption cases are replete
with statements acknowledging the value of state tort actions.'1 The
9 See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 225-26 (2000) ("The
extent to which a federal statute displaces (or 'preempts') state law affects both the substantive
legal rules under which we live and the distribution of authority between the states and the
federal government." (footnote omitted)).
9 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
9 The New York Court of Appeals case MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050
(N.Y. 1916), is generally viewed as the first true product liability case in tort. See OWEN, supra
note 3, § 1.2, at 22 (stating that MacPherson "in many respects began the modern era of
products liability law").
9 This is particularly true of many prescription drugs and medical devices, which have
therapeutic value, but which may also have substantial side effects or other negative risks
associated with them.
10
See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of PharmaceuticalQuality: The
Respective Roles of Regulation and Tort law, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 163, 167 (1998) (discussing
the risk-benefit analysis conducted in the FDA drug approval context); Richard A. Merrill,
Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food and Drug Administration, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
994, 996 (1977) ("'Risk-benefit analysis' . . . includes any technique for making choices that
explicitly or implicitly attempts to measure the potential adverse consequences of an activity
and to predict its benefits.").
01

See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABLITY

§

2 (1998)

[hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT] (providing a basic statement of product liability claims for
defective design and manufacture and for failure to warn).
1o2See DAN

B. DOBBS,

PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, TORTS AND

COMPENSATION 816-18 (6th ed. 2009).
Io3 It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the tort reform movement. For a
reasoned discussion of the issues, see generally Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote
to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093 (1996) (examining the validity of assertions made by critics
of the tort system).
'4See infra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
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tort system serves an intricate set of policy goals, such as corrective
justice, compensation of injured persons, and deterrence. In the area
of product development, the tort system has the ability to influence
product research and development by exerting pressure on
manufacturers to optimize safety in the design and manufacture of
their products, and in the communication to consumers of risks
associated with the products.10 5
The federal agencies entrusted with the job of assuring the safety
and health of the American public have a monumental task. In an era
of economic uncertainty and substantial demand for government
services, the major questions are whether the agencies can accurately
and completely collect the information necessary to their decision
making processes and whether the agencies have sufficient resources
to carry out their charges to protect public health and safety. Many of
the United States Supreme Court's product preemption decisions
involve matters related to drugs and medical devices."1 Therefore, an
examination of the ability of the FDA to achieve its goals is
particularly illustrative.
The FDA's role does not end upon approval of a drug or medical
device for marketing. Many safety problems arise after the drug or
device is on the market, and many problems take a substantial time to
appear. Premarket clinical trials collect information on safety and
effectiveness from a tiny segment of the population. The postmarket
phase is critical in determining the full scope of any risks posed by
the drug or device.10 7 Manufacturers may be less than willing to
provide the FDA with complete data on the postmarket risks of their
products because of their financial investment in them.os In this light,
105See Green, supra note 100, at 184 ("The best prophylactic available to a drug
manufacturer with liability concerns is to include information about all risks that emerge as
promptly as possible.").
106Cf. David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A CriticalExamination of the FDA's Efforts
to Preempt Failure-To-Warn Claims, 96 GEo. L.J. 461, 484 (2008) (stating that products
regulated by the FDA currently constitute one-quarter of American consumer spending).
1
0 See Should FDA Drug and Medical Device Regulation Bar State Liability Claims?:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 37-38
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 House Oversight Hearing] (statement of David A. Kessler, M.D.,
former Comm'r of FDA) (noting that in studies involving only a few thousand patients, serious
and life-threatening side effects with an occurrence of I in 10,000 or less are unlikely to become
apparent until after the drug goes to market), available at http://oversight.house.gov
/documents/20080523115742.pdf. See generally Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort
System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 587, 594-606 (2005) (discussing the role of postmarketing
surveillance and its deficiencies).
10See 2008 House Oversight Hearing, supra note 107, at 32-33 (statement of Aaron
Kesselheim, M.D., Dep't of Pharmacoepidemiology, Brigham Women's Hospital, Boston)
(noting the inherent conflict of interest between the need to disclose safety problems and a
manufacturer's financial interest).

112

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1

the FDA's ability to follow up on drugs and devices in the postmarket
phase is critical, but its effectiveness has been compromised by
limited resources.
A 2007 report of the Institutes of Medicine (IOM) of the National
Academies of Science unqualifiedly stated: "The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) lacks the resources needed to accomplish its
large and complex mission today, let alone to position itself for an
increasingly challenging future." 09 The IOM report characterized the
FDA as "seriously underfunded" for the tasks it must accomplish,
particularly those related to postmarketing surveillance of drugs
granted marketing approval. 1 o In fact, a 2006 report commissioned
by the FDA itself reached similar conclusions regarding the lack of
institutional resources for appropriate postmarket surveillance of
prescription drugs."' This report also identified procedural failings
within the FDA that prevented effective decision making, including
lack of appropriate oversight over a complex process with unclear
criteria." 2
In an age in which health and safety regulations abound, it is
paradoxical that the government is increasingly less capable of
amassing and utilizing the critical information necessary to make the
judgments authorized by federal regulations. Scholars have noted the
effects of such "debilitating limitations on information that reduce the
competence and accountability of agency regulators.""' 3 Even efforts
to correct systemic agency deficiencies in the wake of regulatory
failures, such as the FDA's response to Vioxx, are insufficient to
eliminate the agency's problems in the absence of supporting
resources.114 Crucial regulation lags, even when the need for more
stringent standards has been identified by Congress. The Government
Accountability Office has noted that most of the riskiest medical
1l0INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND

PROTECING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193 (Alma Baciu et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter IOM
REPORT].
"Old. at 193-94.

1See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN
FDA's POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 24-29 (2006),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf (discussing the data constraints faced by the FDA
that increase the difficulty of postmarket safety decisions).
" 2 See id. at 18-23.
113Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort
Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 695 (2007); see also Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 106, at 465
(stating that "the FDA does not have the resources to perform the Herculean task of monitoring
comprehensively the performance of every drug on the market" and citing recent regulatory
failures,4 such as the FDA's failure to adequately respond to the Vioxx crisis).
" See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 106, at 467 (noting that the creation of the Drug
Safety Oversight Board (DSOB) in 2005 was not accompanied by sufficient supporting
resources).
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devices still attain marketing approval through the "substantial
equivalency" grandfathering provision' 15 in the FDCA,'1 6 even
though Congress directed the FDA nearly two decades ago to
promulgate more stringent, safety-conscious regulations for that
entire group of devices.'17 Thus, reliance on regulationsupplemented with voluntary steps taken by manufacturers-to
achieve public health and safety goals will result in incomplete
benefits. Tort litigation is capable of filling the gap between deficient
government regulation and the needed goals.' 18
The IOM report predicted dire consequences if the FDA fails to
improve information collection and maximize resources at the agency
level:
Continued resource shortages will impede the agency's
ability to use new and future scientific and technological
advances in drug research across the lifecycle. In particular,
the limited resources could impede the agency's ability to
detect risks of new drugs in a timely fashion, analyze
emerging drug safety data, and effectively communicate that
information to the public in the ways envisioned in the
committee's report.119
Former FDA Commissioner David A. Kessler has expressed the
opinion that, even with substantial increases in funding, the FDA
would remain unable to meet its many safety obligations. 120 The
"'
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (2006) ("substantial equivalency" devices).
6

" See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA SHOULD TAKE
STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST
STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 27-28 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0
9190.pdf.
"7See Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360i (2006)) (directing FDA to promulgate safety regulations on
each type of device it continued to classify as Class III).
118For example, tort litigation may unearth information regarding products that cause a
detriment to the public health and safety in cases where entities subject to regulation withhold
necessary information about their products' adverse effects. See Wagner, supra note 113, at 711
(referencing product liability cases involving asbestos, tobacco, tampons, and the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine birth control device). Professor Wagner has argued further that even tort litigation
that has been seriously criticized for condemning products that scientific evidence has since
exonerated may have substantial health and safety benefits. Id. at 714 (discussing silicone gel
breast implant litigation).
n1 IOM REPORT, supranote 109, at 194.
120 See 2008 House Oversight Hearing, supra note 107, at 38-39 (statement of David A.
Kessler, M.D., former FDA Comm'r). Another witness before the House Committee's hearing
discussed the example of Guidant's implantable defibrillator device, noting that even though the
FDA conducted multiple inspections of the manufacturing plant following incidents of device
defects, the FDA still was not able to determine the problem. Id. at 62 (testimony of William H.
Maisel, M.D., Director, Medical Device Safety Institute, Dep't of Medicine, Beth Israel
Deaconess Medical Center).
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logical inference drawn from these concerns is that state tort law is
needed to take a greater role in drug and medical device safety.
In matters related to defective products, all of the information
necessary for evaluation of the health and safety aspects of the
products is in the hands of the manufacturers. 121 There is no guarantee
that all critical information will be made available to the regulating
agency. Sometimes important information is withheld, whether
intentionally or inadvertently.12 2 The playing field simply is not level.
Furthermore, products are becoming increasingly technological and
complex, making ever greater demands on regulatory agencies. Many
product defects do not emerge until after the product is on the market,
lendinf urgency to the need for agency intervention in the postmarket
phase. 2 The FDA in particular lacks the personnel and other
resources to collect all the information it needs to conduct a full
balance of risks and benefits and follow through on the health and
safety issues during postmarket surveillance. It must trust the
manufacturers to disclose all relevant information.
Tort litigation provides an incentive to manufacturers to conduct
substantial safety follow-ups on their products on the market. Kessler,
the former FDA Commissioner, testified before Congress that in the
period from 1998 to 2000, fewer than eighty percent of the
postmarket studies required of drug and medical device
manufacturers were actually completed.12 4 Tort litigation also serves
an important role in encouraging manufacturers to make full
disclosure of the risks of their products at all stages, instead of
waiting for the litigation discovery process. In the case of Vioxx,
certain safety studies did not come to light until the time of litigation
because the manufacturer had chosen to interpret the data in a way
that minimized the risks.12 5 Experts have suggested that without tort
121See
id. at 32 (statement of Aaron S. Kesselheim, M.D., Dep't of
Pharmacoepidemiology, Brigham Women's Hospital, Boston) (recognizing the control of the
manufacturer over information relating to its products); id. at 38 (statement of David A. Kessler,
M.D., former FDA Comm'r) (recognizing that the balance of information is on the side of the
manufacturers).
22
1 For example, a bioengineer in the medical device industry testifying before the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform observed that while fraud is rare, lack of care
is generally the result of poor understanding of the importance of the information. Id. at 112
(statement of Christine Ruther, Pres. & Chief Engineer, C & R Engineering, Inc.).
23
1 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 106, at 469.
12 2008 House Oversight Hearing, supra note 107, at 92 (testimony of David A. Kessler,
M.D., former FDA Comm'r).
125See
id. at 74-75 (testimony of Aaron Kesselheim, M.D., Dep't of
Pharmacoepidemiology, Brigham Women's Hospital, Boston). But see id. at 122 (statement of
John E. Calfee of American Enterprise Institute) (stating that Vioxx litigation did not improve
public information about the drug). Gregory Curfman, Executive Editor of the New England
Journal of Medicine, also testified at the hearing regarding a Vioxx clinical study conducted by
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litigation, manufacturers have a reverse incentive-to withhold
information that is relevant to the safety of the product.12 6 In addition
to manufacturer deterrence, litigation serves a role in revealing
information that may assist physicians in their prescribing

decisions.12 7
These issues provide an important backdrop to the Supreme
Court's evolving doctrine of product preemption. As time goes on,
and products become increasingly complex, one can anticipate more
regulation. But more regulation does not necessarily mean either
better regulation or safer products. It is with these issues in mind that
this Article turns to the triad of new Supreme Court cases.
III. REACHING MATURITY IN A NEW TRIAD OF DECISIONS

In 2008, the United States Supreme Court decided two major
product preemption cases that focused on the issue of express
preemption. In early 2009, the Court decided a third case, which
involved the doctrine of implied preemption. This triad of cases
provides a unique opportunity to reevaluate the Court's product
preemption doctrine, and the picture of the dynamics of the doctrine
that emerges is revealing. On the one hand, the Court has developed a
firm approach to certain procedural aspects of preemption analysis,
particularly express preemption, which is useful to judges and
attorneys. On the other hand, this triad of cases is troubling when
viewed in the light of the health and safety role of product liability
law. I first provide a brief critical analysis of each case in the triad.
Thereafter, this Article demonstrates that the Court has moved toward
a unitary standard of preemption analysis that merges-even blursthe distinctions between express preemption and implied preemption.

the manufacturer and published in the Journal in 2000. See id. at 106 (statement of Gregory
Curfman). The reported results focused on the purpose of the study to examine the relationship
between gastrointestinal bleeding and ingestion of Vioxx; the results were very favorable for the
manufacturer. Id. at 106-07. The manufacturer failed to reveal, however, that the study revealed
certain adverse cardiovascular incidents. Id. at 107. Eventually, the cardiac incidents came to
light, but the label was not revised until 2002. Id. When the product was removed from the
market in 2004, the deterrence value of litigation played a role. Id.
126See id. at 75 (testimony of Aaron Kesselheim, M.D., Dep't of Pharmacoepidemiology,
Brigham Women's Hospital, Boston).
27
Id. at 34 (testimony of Aaron Kesselheim, M.D., Dep't of Pharmacoepidemiology,
Brigham Women's Hospital, Boston).
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A. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,128 the Court employed language that
extended beyond the scope of the issues presented and articulated
legal principles that have far-reaching consequences. Riegel, like
Lohr, involved the MDA and its preemption provision, as well as the
role of the FDA.12 9 Riegel differed factually from Lohr in that the
cardiac catheter at issue in the case was a Class III medical device
that had received approval by the FDA pursuant to the premarket
approval process ("PMA process"). 13 0 In contrast, Lohr involved a
device that had been marketed pursuant to the MDA's section 510k
provisions for approval upon a showing that the device was
"substantially equivalent" to a device previously marketed.131 The
cardiac device alleged to be defective in Riegel was a balloon catheter
that had received premarket approval by the FDA pursuant to the full
PMA process in 1994, with supplemental labeling approval in 1995
and 1996.132 Upon inflation, the catheter ruptured, resulting in a
blockage and necessitating coronary bypass surgery.133
The Riegel Court found a sufficient distinction between 510k
"substantial equivalency" and approval under the PMA process to
hold that the claims raised by the plaintiff in Riegel were
preempted.1M The Court addressed the same issues as those raised in
Lohr, based upon the requirements of the same MDA preemption
provision. First, the Court determined that the federal government had
"established or continued in effect" requirements "with respect to" the
catheter in question. Keeping close to the analysis in Lohr, the Court
examined the provisions of the FDA regulation, which interpreted the
preemption provision as applicable "only when the Food and Drug
Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or
there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular
128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1004-05 (discussing the premarket approval process under 21
U.S.C. § 360e).
'13Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 480 (1996).
32
1 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005.
33
1 1d. The district court held that virtually all of the plaintiffs personal injury claims
against the manufacturer were preempted. Id. at 1005-06. The claims were based upon strict
product liability and negligence in testing, design, and manufacture of the catheter, labeling, and
all aspects of sale and distribution. The claims also included breach of express and implied
warranty. Id. at 1006. The district court held all of the claims preempted except for breach of
express warranty and negligent manufacture to the extent that it was based upon duties parallel
to the duties established under federal law. Id. Later, the district court granted summary
judgment to Medtronic on those claims. Id. at 1006 n.2. The Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at
1006.
1
3 Id. at 1007.
128
129

30
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device....
In Lohr, the Court had held that the MDA's labeling
and manufacturing regulations were not device-specific in any sense
that triggered the preemption provision.13 6 The Riegel Court found
that the "[p]remarket approval, in contrast, imoses 'requirements'
under the MDA as [it] interpreted it in Lohr," 37 and held that the
claims were expressly preempted. The Court reasoned as follows:
[T]he FDA may grant premarket approval only after it
determines that a device offers a reasonable assurance of
safety and effectiveness. And while the FDA does not
"'require"' that a device allowed to enter the market as a
substantial equivalent "take any particular form for any
particular reason," the FDA requires a device that has
received premarket approval to be made with almost no
deviations from the specifications in its approval application,
for the reason that the FDA has determined that the approved
form provides a reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness.' 3 8
Thus, the Court paradoxically held that the premarket approval
process per se imposes device-specific requirements, even though no
such requirements appear in the regulations. In this respect, the
Court's analysis was at odds with Lohr.
Similarly, and again in conflict with Lohr, the Riegel Court held
that although state common law applies generally, and not only to the
medical device at issue in the case, the MDA preemption provision
nevertheless barred the claims. Focusing on the statutory language,
the Court stated that "[n]othing in the statutory text suggests that the
pre-empted state requirement must apply only to the relevant device,
or only to medical devices and not to all products and all actions in
general."l 3 9 The plaintiffs had relied upon the same FDA explanatory
regulation that the Court had found instructive in Lohr. The Riegel
Court, however, found the regulation unpersuasiven' and reached a
different result.
15Id. at 1006 (quoting 21 C.F.R. §808.1(d) (2003)) (alteration in original).
36Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501.
'37 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1007.
138Id. (citations omitted).
139Id. at 1010.
14Id. The Court's skepticism of the regulation apparently was based upon statements
made by the FDA in its amicus brief:
Even assuming that this regulation could play a role in defining the MDA's
pre-emptive scope, it does not provide unambiguous support for the Riegels'
position. The agency's reading of its own rule is entitled to substantial deference, . . .
and the FDA's view put forward in this case is that the regulation does not refer to
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Further, the Court determined that state tort law applicable to the
case imposes requirements that are "different from, or in addition to"
the requirements of the PMA process relative to the balloon catheter
and that such requirements "relate to the safety or effectiveness of the
device." 4 1 The Court focused on the meaning of the term
"requirements imposed under state law" set forth in the MDA express
preemption provision. 14 2 Taking its cue from Lohr, the Court made a
sweeping pronouncement regarding the meaning of "requirements" in
the preemption provision of any statute. After noting that a majority
of the Justices in Lohr held the position that common-law tort claims
may impose "requirements" within the meaning of the MDA
preemption provision, 14 3 the Court extended that definition to the
same language appearing in any preemption provision in any federal
statute. The Court stated: "Congress is entitled to know what meaning
this Court will assign to terms regularly used in its enactments.
Absent other indication, reference to a State's 'requirements' includes
its common-law duties."'" Thus, the Court placed the burden
squarely on Congress in the first instance to exclude state
common-law claims from the meaning of "requirements" in a federal
preemption provision or to use some other, more explicit,
terminology.
In determining that the common-law duties were "different from or
in addition to" the duties imposed by federal law, the Court reasoned
that jury verdicts are not the result of the same risk-benefit balancing
as that conducted by the FDA. Juries, the Court stated, are concerned

general tort duties of care, such as those underlying the claims in this case that a
device was designed, labeled, or manufactured in an unsafe or ineffective manner.
Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 27-28,
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179)) (other citation omitted). In Lohr, by contrast, the
Court adopted the explanation of the preemption provision contained in the regulation
itself. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,498-99 (1996).
141 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1007-11.
42
1 Id. at 1006-07.
4
1 3Id. at 1008 ("In Lohr, five Justices concluded that common-law causes of action for
negligence and strict liability do impose 'requirement[s]' and would be pre-empted by federal
requirements specific to a medical device." (alteration in original)). This majority was
comprised of four Justices who concurred in part and dissented in part, as well as Justice Breyer.
See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 503
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
'"Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008. The Court seemed to suggest that the inclusion of
common-law tort judgments within the meaning of "requirements" is a rebuttable presumption.
The Court defended its definition in this particular case, stating that "excluding common-law
duties from the scope of pre-emption would make little sense. State tort law that requires a
manufacturer's catheters to be safer, but hence less effective, than the model the FDA has
approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same effect." Id.
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only with the risks of a product, not with balancing those risks against
the benefits the product offers.14 5 The FDA, by contrast, is concerned
with the full range of costs and benefits associated with the product in
deciding whether to grant premarket approval.14 6
On the surface, Riegel appears to follow closely the fundamentals
of express preemption set forth in the earlier line of cases. Riegel's
formulation of express preemption is generally consistent with the
analysis in Lohr, and thereby follows the line of cases from Cipollone
to Bates. In the process, the Court standardized the definition of the
term "requirements" when that term appears in a general express
preemption provision. Whether this is warranted or not, there is at
least a presumption that "requirements" includes state common-law
judgments.
But the devil is in the details, and there are many in Riegel. First,
Riegel is not entirely consistent with Lohr, its closest Supreme Court
relative. For one thing, the Court refused to hold, consistent with
Lohr, that common-law duties of general applicability were not
"requirements" for the purpose of preemption under the MDA
because they lacked device specificity.147 In its refusal, the Court in
effect embraced the FDA's new position favoring blanket preemption
in product cases.148 The FDA had advanced this position for several
years in amicus briefs 4 9 and placed it in the 2006 preamble to FDCA
amendments. 50 This new position in favor of broad preemption was a
reversal of the position held by the FDA for decades, which
recognized that state tort law coexists with FDA regulation.' 5 ' The
Riegel Court decided not to address the full legal implications of the
2006 preamble.152 Instead, the Court simply reinterpreted the
regulation the Lohr Court had relied on and, with a different
4

1 5 Id.
146Id.
147Id. at
4

1009-10.

Id. at 1010 ("Even assuming that [the earlier] regulation could play a role in defining
the MDA's pre-emptive scope, it does not provide unambiguous support for the Riegels'
position."). The Court noted that the FDA's position on preemption in product liability cases
had recently changed, as embodied in the amicus brief for the United States. Id. (citing Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 27-28, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No.
06-179)).
49
1 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201-03 (2009) (discussing the FDA's new
position favoring preemption); cf Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1010 (relying on amicus brief of United
States for interpretation of the earlier regulation explaining the preemption provision).
1-71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
151See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201-02 (noting that the preamble "reverses the FDA's
longstanding position" regarding the interaction between state law and the FDA's own
regulations).
152
In Levine, the Court did take on the legal effect of the 2006 preamble, and rejected its
application. See id. at 1201; infra notes 226-230 and accompanying text.
18
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interpretation, reached a different result. The Court held that state
common-law duties of general applicability do, in fact, fit within the
regulation's description of those rules that may be preempted under

the MDA.153
Second, the Riegel decision lacks the full contextual analysis of the
statute and regulations invoked in the case, an analysis that the Court
had embraced repeatedly in earlier cases, including in Lohr. In Reigel,
Justice Ginsburg made the argument for this larger contextual
analysis in her dissent. At the outset, Justice Ginsburg stated:
"Contextual examination of the [MDA] convinces me that § 360k(a)'s
inclusion of the term 'requirement' should not prompt a sweeping
154
preemption of mine-run claims for relief under state tort law."
Discussing the legislative history of the MDA, she argued that blanket
preemption of claims based upon devices that had undergone the
PMA process is inconsistent with Congress's professed goal to
provide regulation for an industry greatly in need of it. 55 Moreover,
Justice Ginsburg demonstrated that the impetus for the inclusion of
the MDA's preemption provision in the first instance had been state
premarket approval regulatory schemes that had developed over the
years in the absence of federal oversight, "not any design to suppress
tort suits."1 56
Third, the Court's disparagement of lay juries as arbiters of the
risks and benefits of products is a weak argument and runs counter to
the value the Court has placed on tort judgments in other cases. State
product liability law takes accounts of both the risks and benefits of
the product at issue in a particular case. Jurisdictions recognizing
versions of product liability law in accordance with the Second 57 or
Third Restatement of Torts ss ask jurors to apply a risk-utility
balancing test in defective design cases. A related analysis applies to
most failure to warn cases as well. For example, under New York
law-the applicable substantive law in the Riegel case-the common
law has definitively included risk-utility balancing for many years. As
early as 1983, the New York Court of Appeals held with respect to
design defect claims that the jury was to consider "whether it is a
53

' Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1010. The Court was dismissive of the FDA's earlier explanation
of its own rule, saying that it was "less than compelling." Id.
15Id. at 1014 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
I Id. at 1016 (stating that the majority's position has the "perverse effect" of relieving
of liability under tort law).
medical
56 device sellers
1d. at 1018.
'1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Second Restatement employed
a consumer expectations test, but used an explicit risk-benefit analysis for design defects in the
category of unavoidably unsafe products. See id. cmL k.
5
1 8THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 101, § 2.
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product which, if the design defect were known at the time of
manufacture, a reasonable person would conclude that the utility of
the product did not outweigh the risk inherent in marketing a product
designed in that manner."l59 Reiterating this standard in 1995, the
Court of Appeals further explained that it was founded in
a recognition that there are both risks and benefits associated
with many products and that there are instances in which a
product's inherent dangers cannot be eliminated without
simultaneously compromising or completely nullifying its
benefits. In such circumstances, a weighing of the product's
benefits against its risks is an appropriate and necessary
component of the liability assessment under the policy-based
principles associated with tort law. 16 0
Indeed, this same principle underlies the CarrollTowing formula as a
mechanism for determining whether a defendant has breached a duty
in a negligence case.'6 1
Thus, a jury deliberating whether a product is defective is typically
asked to weigh the benefits against the risks of the product in
deciding whether it is unreasonably dangerous.1 6 2 As Justice Stevens
indicated in his concurring opinion in Riegel, juries merely apply the
59

Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983). The court listed
various factors to be considered by the jury in its risk-utility analysis. Id. at 208-09.
'60Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 703, 735 (N.Y. 1995) (citation omitted).
Applying the risk-utility balancing test to a case involving tobacco products, a New York
appellate court in 2003 cited to the Third Restatement's risk-utility test in support of its holding.
See Miele v. Am. Tobacco Co., 770 N.Y.S.2d 386, 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABtLITY § 2, cmt. g (1998)).
161See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (suggesting
that a defendant fails to meet the appropriate standard of care if the burden of taking adequate
precautions is less than the probability that harm will occur multiplied by the gravity of the
resulting injury).
162 A typical jury instruction on risk-utility balancing in a product liability case states, in
part:
You may find that the product at issue in this case is unreasonably dangerous if you
find that (1) a condition of the product was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries; and that (2) on balance, the benefits of the product's design did not
outweigh the risks of danger inherent in the design.
The defendant has the burden of proving that the benefits of the product's design
outweighed the risks of danger inherent in the design.
3-100 Illinois Forms of Jury Instruction § 100.05B (2008). The instruction follows with factors
for the jury to consider in conducting the balancing test, including, but not limited to, the
usefulness of the product, the likelihood that it would cause injury, the magnitude of the injury
that could result, the availability of alternatives, and whether the manufacturer could have
eliminated or reduced the risk through reasonable care and without impairing the utility of the
product. Id
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law; they do not make the law.'63 This distinction is relevant to Riegel
and all other cases involving statutes in which Congress has
preempted state "requirements" of any sort. It also implies that jury
verdicts, per se, do not have the power to force a defendant to alter its
conduct. Rather, that is a choice left entirely to the defendant,
weighing all the circumstances, including payments of judgments
based upon findings that their products were defective. Regardless of
the legitimacy of this argument, however, the Riegel Court ruled that
the term "requirements" in any preemption provision will be
presumed to include common-law verdicts. 1
Riegel is counterintuitive in an additional way: there is no
guarantee that medical devices marketed pursuant to the PMA process
will fare much better in the postmarket phase than devices falling
within the section 510k "substantial equivalency" designation. The
Court emphasized that the FDA conducts approximately 1,200 hours
of review for each PMA application, far more time than is spent on a
finding of substantial equivalency. 16 5 While extensive review of a
manufacturer's PMA application may be a prediction of the safety
and effectiveness of the product-based only on testing in controlled
situations on very few persons-adverse events can occur in the
postmarket phase.16 6 Some of those adverse events could be due to
inherent defects in the product or negligence of the manufacturer.
Moreover, the fact that the FDA's effectiveness in following through
on postmarket surveillance has been seriously compromised by
insufficient resources 6 7 means that the same safety crisis applies to
any device on the market, regardless of how it got there. Thus, the
basis for the Court's distinction between Riegel and Lohr dissolves in
the postmarket phase.
B. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good
In late 2008, the United States Supreme Court decided a follow-up
case to Cipollone. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good 68 reaffirmed the
importance of Cipollone in the larger scope of the Court's product
preemption doctrine. Although Good did not directly raise the
' 63 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1012 n.1 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
'6 Id. at 1009-10 (majority opinion).
1
65 Id. at 1004.
'See supranotes 107-27 and accompanying text.
167See David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 101
(2005) ("The FDA is perhaps the most capable federal safety agency, but it cannot exert
sufficient discipline on the marketplace to ensure an adequate margin of safety for the devices
on the market, a fact that the agency, at least until recently, itself acknowledged.").
16s129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
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question of preemption of common-law tort claims, the case involved
the same statute, and the same express preemption provision, as
Cipollone. Moreover, the Court's approach offers a window into the
mature product preemption doctrine. While the Court's procedural
approach was consistent with the line of express preemption cases
from Cipollone to Bates, and now Riegel, lurking beneath the surface
of the opinion were some continuing unresolved issues.
The Good respondent-plaintiffs had brought an action claiming
that the defendant cigarette manufacturer had deceived them about the
health hazards bf their so-called "light" cigarettes in violation of a
state deceptive practices statute.169 Philip Morris-whose parent
company was petitioner Altrial 7 0 -had marketed certain of its
cigarettes as containing lower tar and nicotine than regular cigarettes,
based upon test results acquired by the Cambridge Testing Method.171
The plaintiffs alleged that Philip Morris's marketing of certain brands
as "light" fraudulently represented the cigarettes as safer for human
consumption than regular cigarettes. The plaintiffs further alleged that
Philip Morris knew that smokers engaged in various compensatory
smoking behaviors that enabled them to take in the same amount of
nicotine, or more, as with regular cigarettes. 72 They also claimed that
Philip Morris knew that the smoke emitted from its "light" cigarettes
was in fact more harmful in chemical content than smoke from
regular cigarettes. 173 Philip Morris's actions in marketing the "light"
cigarettes, in the plaintiffs' opinion, constituted fraud in violation of
Maine's deceptive practices statute.174
The Good Court agreed with the First Circuit that the claims were
not preempted.17 5 In a five-to-four decision written by Justice Stevens,
(citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §207 (Supp. 2008)).
oSee PhilipMorrisUSA, About Philip Morris USA, http://www.philipmorrisusa.com
/en/cms/Company/CorporateStructure/default.aspx (last visited September 19, 2009).
1' See Good, 129 S. Ct. at 541 & n.2 (discussing the Cambridge Testing Method and
noting that the Federal Trade Commission indicated in 1966 that the process was an acceptable
method for measuring tar and nicotine).
172Id. at 541. These behaviors included covering ventilation holes, inhaling more
frequently or in larger amounts, and holding the smoke in their lungs for longer periods of time.
Id.
7
3As the Court characterized it, "'Light' cigarettes are in fact more harmful because the
increased ventilation that results from their unique design features produces smoke that is more
mutagenic per milligram of tar than the smoke of regular cigarettes." Id. at 542.
4
17 Id. at 541.
5
" Id. at 551. The district court had granted Altria's summary judgment motion on the
ground that the claims were expressly preempted by the cigarette labeling act. Id. at 542. In
doing so, the court characterized the fraud claim as a warning neutralization claim, similar to the
fraud claim held preempted in Cipollone. Id.; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 527 (1992). The Cipollone Court distinguished between fraud claims asserting that the
cigarette manufacturer had neutralized the mandatory packaging warning through its
advertising-which were held preempted-and fraud claims based upon a general state-law
19Id. at 541
70
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the author of the Court's decisions in both Cipollone and Lohr, the
Court re-emphasized the basic principles of express preemption
underlying those two decisions. First, the Court stated that the intent
of Congress is the "'ultimate touchstone"' of any express preemption
decision.176 Second, the Court again articulated the presumption
against preemption: "[W]e begin our analysis 'with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."', 7 7 Citing its earlier decisions,'78 the Court reaffirmed the
need to leave matters of historical state interest-particularly state
police power-in the hands of the states.17 9 Of particular interest was
the fact that the Court stated the presumption rule broadly. Thus, not
only does it have continuing vitality, but it applies in matters of both
express and implied preemption. 8 0
The Court acknowledged that the cigarette labeling act's
requirements, coupled with the express preemption provision, prohibit
states from creating their own cigarette warnings different from those
established in the statute. But that prohibition in no way prevents the
states from enforcing their deceptive practices laws in matters related
to cigarettes labeled in conformity with the labeling acts. Moreover,
the Court stated that the purposes of the labeling act "would [not] be
served by limiting the States' authority to prohibit deceptive
statements in cigarette advertising."' 8 ' Still, the Court emphasized, the

duty not to deceive-which were not preempted. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527-29. In Good, the
First Circuit reversed, however, finding that the fraud claim was more akin to the fraud claim in
Cipollone that was held not preempted. Good, 129 S. Ct. at 542.
176Good, 129 S. Ct. at 543 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
'"Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (alteration in
original).
"8 Another preemption case the Court relied upon was Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525 (2001), which also invoked the preemption provisions of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA). In Reilly, tobacco product manufacturers and retailers
brought suit seeking to have certain Massachusetts deceptive practices regulations governing the
advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars declared preempted by federal
law. See id. (addressing 940 MASS. CODE REGs. 21.01-.07, 22.01-.09 (2000)). The state
regulations primarily imposed limitations on the sale and advertising of tobacco products to
underage youths. Id. at 533-34. The Supreme Court conducted an express preemption analysis
and held that the regulations relating to cigarettes were preempted by the FCLAA. Id. at
550-51. With regard to the regulations relating to smokeless tobacco products and cigars, the
Court noted that the FCLAA was inapplicable. Id. at 565. The Court then held that certain of the
advertising regulations violated the First Amendment as impermissible restraints on commercial
speech. Id. at 565-66.
79
1 See Good, 129 S. CL at 543.
1soThe Court referenced both Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485, and Reilly, 533 U.S. at 541-42.
181Good, 129 S. Ct. at 544.
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touchstone of the analysis is the intent of Congress within the
language of the express preemption provision.' 82
The main value of Good is in reinforcing the Court's approach to
express preemption; the case adds little to the substance of the
product preemption doctrine. As in Riegel, the Good Court reaffirmed
its internal process of conducting an express preemption analysis. In
Good, however, the Court, after finding no express preemption,
proceeded to conduct an implied preemption analysis in response to
the petitioners' argument that the Maine regulations constituted an
obstacle to the achievement of Federal Trade Commission policies
advancing the development and promotion of low tar cigarettes.183
The Court decided that no such obstacle existed.'" But its brief
engagement in the process of implied preemption raised the same
confusing set of questions as prior product preemption decisions. The
Court could have decided, consistent with Cipollone, that moving to
an implied preemption analysis was inappropriate-that the issue was
encompassed fully by the express preemption provision-but the
Court did not do so, opting instead to conduct an implied preemption
analysis for reasons that remain unclear.
C. Wyeth v. Levine
The United States Supreme Court took the opportunity to
circumscribe the limits of implied preemption in Wyeth v. Levine,'8 5 a
case that originated in the Vermont state court system. Although the
case specifically involved the new drug provisions of the FDCA, 186 it
has far-reaching implications for all other product cases raising
the
that
holding
In
arguments.
preemption
implied
respondent-plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims were not impliedly
preempted, the Court upheld the decision of the Supreme Court of
Vermont.187
The claims arose from the administration of the defendant's drug
Phenergan by the "IV push" method, during which the drug was
accidentally injected into an artery. The resulting arterial damage
ultimately led to amputation of the plaintiffs forearm.188 The plaintiff
182Id. at
183Id.

543.

at 549.
1Id. at 551.
18 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
1621 U.S.C. § 355 (2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-379, 122 Stat. 4075 (2008); 21
C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (2009) (explaining the application approval process and labeling
procedures).
18
7 Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187.
18Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006), affd, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
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brought an action for inadequate warnings based upon negligence and
product liability.189 Wyeth sought dismissal of the claims on a
summary judgment motion on the ground that the labeling procedures
in effect pursuant to the FDCA-with which Wyeth had compliedpreempted the claims based upon inadequacy of the warning.' 90 The
trial court denied Wyeth's summary judgment motion, and the case
went to trial, resulting in a jury verdict for the plaintiff on both the
negligence and product liability claims. 19 1
The Phenergan label contained a warning about the potential
dangers of the drug to the patient's arteries if administered by IV
push, rather than IV drip. The warning stated in part that "extreme
care should be exercised to avoid . . . inadvertent intra-arterial

injection."l 92 Wyeth had submitted a revised warning to the FDA in
1988, which strengthened the language relating to inadvertent arterial
injection. The FDA did not directly address the proposed language or
respond to Wyeth's submission.193 No new label activity occurred
until 1996, when the FDA reviewed the existing label and told Wyeth
to retain the language of the label then in use, giving no reason.194
The FDCA contains no express preemption provision applicable to
drugs. Accordingly, Wyeth argued that the plaintiffs common-law
claims conflicted with the FDA's approval of the original warning
label and with its subsequent failure to approve the stronger warning
submitted in 1988.195 Wyeth therefore asserted that the trial court
should have held that the plaintiffs claims were impliedly
preempted.196 The company followed two lines of argument. In the
first, Wyeth said that complying with both the label required by the
FDA and any common-law duties imposed by tort law would be
impossible.19 7 In the second, Wyeth argued that state tort damages for
personal injuries allegedly caused by defective drugs effectively
constituted a penalty for compliance with FDA labeling regulations.
Thus, the argument continued, allowing tort claims would create an
obstacle to accomplishing the purpose of the federal labeling

89

1 Id.
190Id. at 183.

191
Id. at 182. The court similarly denied Wyeth's motion for judgment as a matter of law
after the verdict on the same ground. Id. at 183.
92
' Id. at 183 n.1.
93
' See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1192 (2009).
'11Id. The Court derived its information regarding the interaction between Wyeth and the
FDA on the matter of the Phenergan label from the trial record. Id.
95
Iid. at 1193.
1%Id.
197d.
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regulations 9 8 because the expert decisions of the FDA in approving
drugs for market would be second-guessed by lay juries.'99
The Vermont Supreme Court rejected both implied preemption
arguments, and the United States Supreme Court affirmed. The Court
began by restating the "two cornerstones" of the preemption
doctrine, 20 relying on the principles set forth in Lohr and other
decisions. What is especially striking is that the Court's analysis in
this implied preemption decision tracks its express preemption
analysis to a large extent. First, the Court restated that "'the purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case."' 201
Furthermore, the Court again emphasized the need for deference to
the police powers of the States unless "the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress" was to preempt state law.2 02 Thus, the Court applied the
presumption against preemption, which seemed to end the debate
over whether the presumption may apply in cases of implied
preemption.
In discerning the purpose of Congress, the Court fully examined
the context of the relevant statutory provisions. The Court deemed
significant several events in the history of the FDCA. The Court
noted that when Congress enacted the Federal Food and Drugs Act in
1906 20 3 -- the predecessor to the FDCA-it intended the Act to
supplement pre-existing state regulations and common law.20 4
Subsequently, Congress continued to have concern for the safety of
drugs marketed to the public and enacted the FDCA in 1938,205 which
included provisions for new drug applications requiring FDA
approval.'3
The Act has been amended several times, but the Court was
especially interested in the 1962 amendments. At that time, Congress
amended the FDCA in two ways that the Court found relevant to its
decision in Levine. First, the amendments placed the burden of
proving the safety of a drug that was the subject of a new drug
application on the shoulders of the manufacturer.207 Prior to the
amendment, the FDA was responsible for demonstrating that the drug
1s Id.
1Id. at 1194.
N Id. at 1194-95.
201Id. at 1194 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996)).
m Id. at 1194-95.
203
Federal Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
2N Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195.
20 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified

as amended at 21 U.S.C.A §§ 301-395 (West 2009)).
206 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(c).
2 See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781,
781-82, 784.

§§

102(d), 104(b), 76 Stat 780,
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was harmful to prevent it from being released into the consumer
market.208 Second, the 1962 amendments contained a saving clause,
which provided: "Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as
invalidating any provision of State law .. . unless there is a direct and
positive conflict between such amendments and such provision of
State law."2209 The Court also noted that in 1976 Congress enacted the
Medical Device Amendments 210 to the FDCA, which included an
express preemption provision, but has never included such a
provision for drugs subject to the Act. 2 11 Finally, the Court examined
the 2007 amendments to the FDCA,2 12 which strengthened the FDA's
ability to require drug label changes after the drug has been approved
for marketing, but which still allowed the manufacturer to make
appropriate label changes without FDA prior approval.2 13
With reference to these congressional enactments, the Court first
addressed Wyeth's argument that it could not comply with both the
FDCA and the obligations imposed under state tort law through
money judgments. Wyeth had interpreted the FDA's indifference to
its proposed label modification as an absolute prohibition against
either providing a stronger warning label or eliminating IV push as an
acceptable method for drug delivery.2 14 A state tort judgment, Wyeth
argued, would effectively require the manufacturer to modify the
label in one of these ways. The Court rejected this argument because
Wyeth could have provided a stronger warning about the IV-push
method without prior FDA approval and without falling afoul of
federal laws on misbranded drugs.215 Examining the trial record, the
Court concluded that nothing in the record suggested that the FDA
had made any safety judgment about Wyeth's proposed label
modification, or that the FDA's indifference bore any substantive
meaning. Thus, Wyeth could have provided a warning that comported
with state-law tort duties without violating federal law.2 16
208Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195.

209Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-78 1, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793.
21
oMedical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 521, 90 Stat. 539, 574
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006)).
21 1
Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.
212
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat.
823.
213
See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196 (citing rule of construction at 121 Stat. 925-26).
2 14
See Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 188 (Vt. 2006), aff'd, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
215
Wyeth argued, among other things, that if it had strengthened the Phenergan warning
without prior FDA approval, it would have either become subject to the "new drug" rules once
again (on the theory that Phenergan with a new label would thereby become a new drug) or be
marketing a "misbranded" drug. See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196-98. The Court rejected these
arguments
21 6 as both unfaithful to Congress' meaning and counterintuitive. See id. at 1196-97.
1d. at 1198-99.
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The Court next addressed Wyeth's argument that state tort-law
judgments constituted an obstacle to the proper and effective
administration of the federal drug labeling requirements.2 17 Wyeth
essentially argued that, based upon its expertise, the FDA is the only
entity that Congress has allowed to render decisions about drug
labels, through a complex process of risk-utility analysis.218
Accordingly, in Wyeth's view, allowing state tort claims against a
drug manufacturer would inappropriately supplant the FDA's
expertise with lay jury judgments and prevent the FDA from
effectively doing its job.2 19 The Court rejected this argument as "an
untenable interpretation of congressional intent and an overbroad
view of an agency's power to pre-empt state law." 2 20 The Court stated
that every prior action of Congress vis-a-vis the safety of prescription
drugs led to the conclusion that Congress assumed all along that state
common law would provide remedies for injured consumers. 22 1 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on both Congress's actions
and its silence. Thus, the Court emphasized that Congress has never
included an express preemption provision in the FDCA, with the
exception of the MDA, and stated: "Its silence on the issue, coupled
with its certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation, is
powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be
the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness."2 22
The Court's examination of the entire history of the FDCA in
relation to coexisting common-law actions is not new. In the 1984
case of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,223 the Court held that the
plaintiffs decedent's claim for punitive damages was not impliedly
preempted because Congress intended the federal statute in question

2 17
218

2 19

See id. at 1199.
See id.

See id. at 1194, 1199.

220mId.at

1199.

221See id.
2
n Id. at 1200.

The Court quoted from a unanimous 1989 preemption decision: "The case
for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of the
operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both
concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them." Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166-67 (1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
223464 U.S. 238 (1984). Silkwood involved the question whether the exclusivity of the
state workers' compensation statute barred the plaintiff from bringing his decedent's claim for
punitive damages in court. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908, 912, 915-20
(10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 238 (1984). The preemption question arose because the federal
Atomic Energy Act purported to occupy the field in matters of nuclear safety. See Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983).
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to preempt only state regulation and not state common-law
verdicts.224 The Court stated:
[Tlhere is no indication that Congress even seriously
considered precluding the use of such remedies either when it
enacted the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 or when it amended it
in 1959. This silence takes on added significance in light of
Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons
injured by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that
Congress would, without comment, remove all means of
judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct. 225
In Levine, the Court employed a similar approach. The Court
examined, as it had in Silkwood, the long history of the relationship
between common-law actions and the federal statute and Congress's
failure to supplant state actions with a federal remedial scheme.
Additionally, the Court noted the existence of the saving clause and
the acquiescence of the FDA in the complementary role of state
common law during most of the long history of the Act.
The Court reasoned that all these factors substantially outweighed
the FDA's sudden and recent change of view on preemption, as set
forth in the 2006 preamble to an FDA regulation amending the drug
226
labeling requirements.26 The Levine Court strongly rejected any
application of the 2006 preamble to the issues in the case. In the
preamble,227 the FDA curiously stated that its position favoring
preemption of drug and medical device tort claims "represents the
,228
The agency
government's long standing views on preemption."
took the position that "[s]tate law actions can rely on and propagate
2 24

22

See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255-56.

5Id. at 251.
6
See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1200-04; see also Requirements on Content and Format of
Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan.
24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
227The statement appeared in the "Supplementary Information" section of certain
amendments to the labeling requirements, in a section designated "Comments on Product
Liability Implications of the Proposed Rule." Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling
for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3933-36. The FDA
relied on arguments submitted on its behalf by the Department of Justice in various amicus
briefs in earlier product liability cases, id. at 3934-35, concluding that "State laws conflict with
and stand as an obstacle to achievement of the full objectives and purposes of Federal law when
they purport to compel a firm to include in labeling or advertising a statement that FDA has
considered and found scientifically unsubstantiated." Id at 3935.
mId. at 3934. Apparently, the views had been expressed in a number of government
amicus briefs for several years prior to the appearance of the 2006 preamble. See id. ("FDA
believes that under existing preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling under the act . ..
preempts conflicting or contrary State law. Indeed, the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf
of FDA, has filed a number of amicus briefs making this very point.").
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interpretations of the act and FDA regulations that conflict with the
agency's own interpretations and frustrate the agency's
implementation of its statutory mandate." 22 9 The FDA further stated:
State law actions also threaten FDA's statutorily prescribed
role as the expert Federal agency responsible for evaluating
and regulating drugs. State actions ... encourage, and in fact
require, lay judges and juries to second-guess the assessment
of benefits versus risks of a specific drug to the general
public-the central role of FDA-sometimes on behalf of a
single individual or group of individuals. That individualized
reevaluation of the benefits and risks of a product can result
in relief-including the threat of significant damage awards
or penalties-that creates pressure on manufacturers to
attempt to add warnings that FDA has neither approved nor
found to be scientifically required.2 30
These statements reversed the position that the FDA had been
following in seventy years of jurisprudence under the FDCA.
The Court granted no deference to the FDA's statements for
several reasons. First, interested parties had not been granted an
opportunity for comment, thus rendering the statements on state law
"inherently suspect in light of this procedural failure." 231 Second, the
views set forth in the regulation's preamble conflicted with a much
longer-standing position of the FDA.232 Moreover, the Court stated,
prior to its "dramatic change" in position in 2006, the FDA had
accepted state tort law as providing remedial and deterrent value in
ways that federal regulation was unable to achieve.233

229

Id.

2o Id. at

3935.

231
Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
2
- Id. at 1201-02 ("[ut appears

that the FDA traditionally regarded state law as a
complementary form of drug regulation.").
233Id. The Vermont Supreme Court had taken a different, but related, tack in refusing to
grant deference to the statements made in the 2006 preamble. The court focused on the
principles of Chevron deference and determined that they had not been met. The court stated:
"Under Chevron, deference to an agency's interpretation is appropriate only when a statute is
'silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue' the agency has considered; otherwise,
'the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."' Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 192 (Vt. 2006), af'd, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009)
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
This standard was not met in Levine, the court said, because the FDCA was not "silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue" in the case. Id. Accordingly, the court stated,
"[n]othing in the FDA's new statement alters our conclusion that it would be possible for
defendant to comply with both its federal obligations and the obligations of state common law."
Id. at 193.
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Justice Alito, in his dissent in Levine, argued that "[a] faithful
application of this Court's conflict pre-emption cases compels the
conclusion that the FDA's 40-year-long effort to regulate the safety
and efficacy of Phenergan pre-empts respondent's tort suit."23 4 Rather
than examining the full history of Supreme Court product preemption
jurisprudence, however, Justice Alito relied almost exclusively on
Geier, a case that has only limited relevance.235 The Levine dissent
recognized that the FDCA authorizes the FDA to make safety
determinations about new drugs,236 but ignored the fact that the
necessary safety determination was not made in this case. Instead, the
dissent criticized the majority on policy grounds, stating: "[The
majority] ignores the antecedent question of who-the FDA or a jury
in Vermont-has the authority and responsibility for determining the
'adequacy' of Phenergan's warnings."237 The dissent argued that
Congress intended only for the FDA to make health and safety
determinations about prescription drugs, and that a decision by the
FDA to allow a new drug to be marketed, as a matter of law,
conflicted with state tort law.238 A large portion of the dissenting
opinion argued that the facts in the record should have been
interpreted differently to support the position that the FDA had
conducted a full risk-benefit analysis of Wyeth's label. 2 39 The dissent
then applied Geier broadly to conclude that state tort law should have
been preempted.m These arguments render meaningless the saving
clause in the FDCA and suggest that it should be ignored for the
241
purpose of implied preemption analysis.

2 Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1220 (Alito, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Scalia joined Justice Alito in dissent.
5
2 See infra notes 259-273 and accompanying text.
6
3 Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1218 (Alito, J., dissenting).
37
Id. at 1217.
23
s See id. at 1220 ("Where the FDA determines, in accordance with its statutory mandate,
that a drug is on balance 'safe,' our conflict pre-emption cases prohibit any State from
countermanding that determination.").
2 See id. at 1222-26.
240
Id. at 1220, 1229. The dissent argued that "Geier does not countenance the use of state
tort suits to second-guess the FDA's labeling decisions." Id. at 1229.
dissent stated the following about the FDCA saving clause: "But a provision that
2ITe
simply recognizes the background principles of conflict pre-emption is not a traditional 'saving
clause,' and even if it were, it would not displace our conflict-pre-emption analysis." Id. at 1221
n.4 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)).
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IV. THE UNITARY PRODUCT PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

A. Toward a Unitary Standard
The recent triad of Supreme Court product preemption casesRiegel, Good, and Levine-taken together demonstrate a distinct
movement in the Court toward a unitary product preemption doctrine.
This unitary doctrine has the effect of merging the concepts of
express preemption and implied preemption into a single, interrelated
process. The earlier Supreme Court cases, upon closer examination,
foreshadowed this development, and indeed the Court has been
moving toward a unitary standard for some time. Much of the
confusion that has emerged from the fluctuating standards that
appeared to characterize the product preemption doctrine over the
past two decades was a result of assumptions made by attorneys and
scholars as to the fixed nature of that doctrine. In turn, the Court fed
these assumptions with its statements about the doctrine, many of
which separated express preemption analysis from implied
preemption analysis, leaving the impression that discrete rules should
apply to each. As its latest opinions demonstrate, however, the Court
has instead merged the standards.
In the cases prior to 2008, the Court felt free to apply express or
implied preemption as it saw appropriate. In Lohr and Bates, the
Court conducted an express preemption analysis, which ended the
inquiry. In Buckman, however-which involved the same federal
statute as Lohr-the Court barely acknowledged express preemption
and did not conduct an express preemption analysis in holding the
claims preempted under an implied preemption analysis.242 In Geier,
the Court conducted an express preemption analysis and, after
concluding that the claims were not preempted thereunder, proceeded
to hold the claims preempted under an implied preemption theory.243
In all of this muddle, the presumption against preemption appeared
sporadically and inconsistently.
24 2

Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). The Buckman Court's
entire discussion of express preemption was as follows:
Respondent also suggests that we should be reluctant to find a pre-emptive conflict
here because Congress included an express pre-emption provision in the MDA....
To the extent respondent posits that anything other than our ordinary pre-emption
principles apply under these circumstances, that contention must fail in light of our
conclusion last Term in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. . . . that neither an
express pre-emption provision nor a saving clause "bar[s] the ordinary working of
conflict pre-emption principles."
Id. at 352 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
24 3
See Geier, 529 U.S. at 881.
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With these persistent problems in mind, I posit a simple theory:
What if all of these inconsistencies could be explained by a unitary
standard that does not pigeonhole courts into categories of preemption
or mandatory application of the presumption against preemption?
Arguably, what is left is a loose rule of policy and discretion in the
service of shifting notions of federalism. Before examining the
merits-and demerits-of such an approach, it is worthwhile to
examine the ways in which the new triad of cases has moved the
Supreme Court in the direction of a unitary standard.
Throughout much of its product preemption jurisprudence, the
Court has treated the express preemption and implied preemption
analyses not as two distinct processes, but as parts of a single
integrated process containing multiple factors. In its most recent
decision on implied preemption, Wyeth v. Levine,244 this approach is
evident. The Levine Court placed implied preemption into the
analytical line defined by the major recent express preemption cases
of Cipollone, Lohr, Riegel, and Good. In so doing, the Court also
marginalized Geier.245 Although Levine did not involve an express
preemption provision, the Court's choice to embrace the analytical
line of express preemption cases, instead of Geier, to resolve the
conflict preemption issues indicates that it views the preemption
doctrine in a unitary fashion.
In both Riegel and Good, the Court closely followed the express
preemption principles it had articulated in earlier cases, such as
Cipollone and Lohr, and which it subsequently embraced in Levine.
In Riegel, the Court directly contrasted the premarket approval
process with the 510k "substantial equivalency" process in Lohr,
saying that although the 510k process did not establish federal
requirements for safety or effectiveness in Lohr, the PMA process at
issue in Riegel did establish such requirements.24 6 Based largely upon
this distinction, Riegel and Lohr yielded different preemption results,
but the analytical process was the same.
Similarly, in its express preemption analysis in Good, the Court
stayed close to the interpretation of the express preemption provision
as previously outlined in Cipollone and another cigarette labeling act
case, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.24 7 Although Reilly had involved
244
129
245

S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
See infra notes 259-273 and accompanying text (illustrating the Levine Court's
marginalization of Geier).
24
6 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007 (2008). In Lohr, the Court had
distinguished the PMA process from the 510k process, without ruling on whether the former
constituted federal regulations that could conflict with state tort judgments. See Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,477-79 (1996).
27533 U.S. 525 (2001); see also supra note 178 (discussing Reilly).
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Massachusetts deceptive practices regulations, which the Court held
were preempted by the cigarette labeling act, the Good Court
distinguished the Maine regulations at issue from those in Reilly. The
Maine regulations were not directed exclusively at tobacco products,
nor did they reference the relationship between smoking and health.248
Rather, the Court held, the regulations were based upon the state duty
not to deceive. 249 As such, the Court treated the Maine regulations as
requirements analogous to the common-law fraud rule that it had
upheld against the preemption challenge in Cipollone.25 0 Once again,
the Court followed an internal express preemption analysis in a
consistent manner.
But that is where consistency dissipates. In Cipollone and Reilly,
the Court's analysis ended with express preemption. Because the
Court held the claims expressly preempted in Reilly, there was no
need to proceed further. In Cipollone, the Court held some, but not
all, claims expressly preempted, yet chose not to conduct an implied
preemption analysis. 251 In Good, the Court proceeded to conduct an
implied preemption analysis after fully resolving the issues on express
preemption grounds.m As previously stated, the Court had a choice
to end the inquiry in Good with its express preemption analysis, but
opted not to do so. What may account for these divergent approaches
is the unitary standard, by which the Court chooses among a menu of
analytical factors in reaching its result. The mix of factors would then
vary from case to case.
The unitary standard may also account for the inconsistencies in
application of the presumption against preemption. In Good, the
Court expressly stated that the presumption against preemption
applies to both express preemption and implied preemption,253 and in
Levine, the Court applied the presumption.254 Elsewhere, the Court
has either rejected or ignored it.

248

24 9

2

See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 545-47 (2008).

Id.

5Jd. at 549 ("[W]e conclude now, as the plurality did in Cipollone, that 'the phrase
"based on smoking and health" fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the more
general duty not to make fraudulent statements."'); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 529 (1992).
251 The Court firmly rejected the implied preemption analysis that had been employed by
the Third Circuit below. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516-17. Although Justice Stevens used
some language that seemed to fit with implied preemption, the analysis was clearly an express
preemption analysis. See id. at 518 (stating that "there is no general, inherent conflict between
federal pre-emption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state
common-law damages actions").
252
See Good, 129 S. Ct. at 549-51.
3
25 Id. at 543.
24See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
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Another sign that the Court follows a unitary standard is the lack
of consistency of standards when analyzing a particular type of
implied preemption. For example, the Court has from time to time
shifted its formulation of the applicable standard for deciding whether
it was impossible for a defendant to comply with both the federal
requirements and state law. 5 The Court has also on occasion
articulated the types of conflict preemption as a single standard. In
Geier, the Court refused to nit-pick among "types" of conflict
preemption. The Court stated:
We see no grounds, then, for attempting to distinguish among
types of federal-state conflict for purposes of analyzing
whether such a conflict warrants pre-emption in a particular
case. That kind of analysis, moreover, would engender legal
uncertainty with its inevitable systemwide costs (e.g.,
conflicts, delay, and expense) as courts tried sensibly to
distinguish among varieties of "conflict" (which often shade,
one into the other) when applying this complicated rule to the
many federal statutes that contain some form of an express
pre-emption provision, a saving provision, or as here, both.
Nothing in the statute suggests Congress wanted to
complicate ordinary experience-proved princiF les of conflict
pre-emption with an added "special burden."25
In all the fuss and bother of the aftermath of Geier, this simple
statement of a unitary standard has been largely ignored.
In contrast, in Levine the Court did indeed distinguish among the
types of conflict preemption. The Court conducted separate and
distinct analyses of Wyeth's argument that it was impossible to
comply with both the FDA requirements and tort-law judgments and
its argument that state tort law stands as an obstacle to the effective
achievement of the goals of the FDCA drug provisions. It appears,
then, that the Court feels comfortable choosing to deal separately with
the types of conflict preemption when it deems it appropriate, but
equally comfortable collapsing the analysis into a single process in
other cases.
The notion of a unitary standard was raised-albeit obliquely-by
Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in Levine, in which he
2s See id. at 1208-09 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (listing several cases applying
different formulations of the standard).
26 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000); see also id. at 873 ("The
Court has not previously driven a legal wedge-only a terminological one-between 'conflicts'
that prevent or frustrate the accomplishment of a federal objective and 'conflicts' that make it
'impossible' for private parties to comply with both state and federal law.").
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concurred in the judgment but rejected a broad role for implied
preemption. Justice Thomas rejected the "purposes and objectives"
analysis conducted by the Court in determining whether state law
stood as an obstacle to accomplishing federal goals. He pointed to the
tendency of the Court to "embark[] on its own freeranging
speculation about what the purposes of the federal law must have
been." 2 57 In rejecting this approach, he essentially rejected wholesale
a role for obstacle preemption. Apparently, he was willing to consider
the purposes and objectives of Congress in determining whether
express preemption applied, as in Myrick,25 8 but saw no role for that
analysis when no express preemption provision existed. Justice
Thomas's criticism of obstacle preemption suggests that the Court
believes these purposes and objectives do have a role in preemption
analysis in a way that collapses express preemption and implied
preemption into a single standard.
B. The Marginalizationof Geier
Every product preemption decision from the Court since Geier has
cited that case for one principle or another. It is the Rorschach inkblot
in which everyone sees something different. Nearly a decade after it
was decided, the picture has finally become clearer. Geier stands for
one proposition: When a court conducts an express preemption
analysis and determines that the provision does not preempt the
plaintiffs claims, nothing prohibits the court from holding the claims
preempted under a theory of implied preemption. This may apply
even when the federal statute contains a saving clause that recognizes
the continued vitality of state law. But Geier also has been
misleading. The case seemed to suggest that a saving clause,
especially when coupled with an express preemption provision, may
always be ignored. As a result, Geier has engendered more confusion
in the product preemption area than any other case. It has taken nearly
a decade for the Supreme Court to offer some clarity on Geier. What
emerges from the cases decided in 2008 and 2009 is a better
understanding of Geier'snarrow applicability.
In Geier, the Court devoted a substantial portion of its discussion
to the role of the saving clause in the preemption analysis. In
particular, the Court rejected the notion that a saving clause could
2
m Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1212 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
" 8 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 283-87 (1995) (holding, in a majority
opinion written by Justice Thomas, that plaintiffs' state common law claims for negligent design
of antilock brakes were neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by federal law).
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prevent conflict preemption where an actual conflict exists between
the federal statute or regulation and the state laws involved-in this
case, state common law. The Court stated: "[W]e conclude that the
saving clause foresees-it does not foreclose-the possibility that a
federal safety standard will pre-empt a state common-law tort action
with which it conflicts."2 59 In so stating, the Court denied the saving
clause the status of a talisman and seemed to suggest that the saving
clause could freely be ignored. One question that remained was
whether saving clauses serve any purpose at all in a preemption
analysis. Congress must have thought they did; it has included them
in many statutes in areas of the law in which state law has operated by
way of regulation or common law. 26
An examination of one of the cases on which Geier relies to
support a diminished role for the saving clause demonstrates that
Geier does not-indeed, cannot-offer an absolute answer in such a
complex area of the law. In United States v. Locke, 26 1 a decision
issued only a few months before Geier, the Court stated that the
saving clauses in the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990262 must be read
in the context of both their textual idiosyncrasies and the historical
relationship between the federal government and the states on matters
related to interstate navigation.263 The Court stated:
Limiting the saving clauses as we have determined respects
the established federal-state balance in matters of maritime
commerce between the subjects as to which the States retain
concurrent powers and those over which the federal authority
displaces state control. . . . We think it quite unlikely that

Congress would use a means so indirect as the saving clauses
. . . to upset the settled division of authority by allowing
States to impose additional unique substantive regulation on
the at-sea conduct of vessels. We decline to give broad effect
Geier,529 U.S. at 870.
m6See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9659(h) (2006) (stating that the section of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act providing for citizens suits to remedy
violations of the Act "does not affect or otherwise impair the rights of any person under Federal,
State, or common law").
261529 U.S. 89 (2000). Locke was an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought
by a trade association of tanker operators against state and local officials seeking to enforce
certain Washington state regulations regarding oil tankers. See id. at 97. The Supreme Court
held that at least some of the state rules were preempted by the federal regulatory scheme. See
id. at 109-10.
262Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006). The federal interest
in interstate navigation is longstanding, and the Court reviewed the history of federal
involvement in these matters, beginning with the Federalist Papers. See Locke, 529 U.S. at
99-103.
263
See Locke, 529 U.S. at 105-06.
2
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to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful
regulatory scheme established by federal law.2 6
Thus, the Court did not allow state regulations to alter the
longstanding and evolving relationship between the federal
government and the states, in which federal interests dominated in the
matters relevant to the case.
Conversely, logic dictates that "respect[ing] the established
federal-state balance" would apply equally when the "settled division
of authority" between the states and the federal government assumes
the existence and utility of state tort actions in the same area of the
law. In other words, the entire context of the statute and the saving
clause must be given full effect in the preemption analysis. Geier
found support in Locke, but a fair reading of both Locke and Geier is
that interpreting the saving clause is not a one-way street. There will
be circumstances in which the saving clause should apply broadly to
allow state regulation and/or common law.
Turning again to Geier, the federal standard at issue there
established a scheme of gradual phased-in passive restraints, with a
menu of options that made no single passive restraint mandatory.265
The specificity of the standard, and the context of the way in which it
implemented the goals of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
drove the result. There was further language in Geier indicating that
the Court continued to respect the role of state common law in
product safety. The Court stated:
[T]he saving clause reflects a congressional determination
that occasional nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a
system in which juries not only create, but also enforce,
safety standards, while simultaneously providing necessary
compensation to victims. That policy by itself disfavors
pre-emption, at least some of the time. But we can find
nothing in any natural reading of the two provisions that
would favor one set of policies over the other where a
jury-imposed safety standard actually conflicts with a federal
safety standard.2 6
Notwithstanding this respect for state common law, the Court held
that an actual conflict existed because a tort judgment concluding that
the product was defective for lack of an airbag directly conflicted
264

Id. at 106 (citation omitted).
See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 878-81 (2000).
266
Id. at 871 (emphasis added).
265
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with both the letter (airbag not required) and the purpose (gradual
phase-in) of the federal law. Viewed as another cog in the wheel of
the unitary standard, Geier'sresult reflected a contextual analysis of a
unique and very narrow statute. Geier does not mandate identical
results when other statutes, claims, and policies are involved. Nor
does it mandate an implied preemption analysis in every case in
which an express preemption provision does not bar the claims.
In Levine, the majority recognized these points and put Geier in its
proper place. Refusing to adopt Geier wholesale, the Court
recognized, among other things,2 that the mix of federal interests
and goals involved in Geier was different from that in Levine in ways
that rendered Geier largely inapplicable to the case. The Levine Court
stated: "Indeed, the 'complex and extensive' regulatory history and
background relevant to this case . . . undercut the FDA's recent

pronouncements of pre-emption [in the 2006 preamble], as they
reveal the longstanding coexistence of state and federal law and the
FDA's traditional recognition of state-law remedies...."268 Further,
the Court distinguished the agency inaction in Levine from the
government's specific action in developing the unique set of federal
passive-restraint standards applicable in Geier. The Court noted that
the FDA had not determined that Wyeth's existing label was adequate
or set any kind of safety standard relevant to Wyeth's proposed
label. 269 Accordingly, the "longstanding coexistence of state and
federal law" in the area of drug safety took precedence.
The Levine dissent relied heavily on an interpretation of Geier that
was patently overbroad. In referencing Geier, the dissent noted that
the Court had examined the underlying purpose of the
passive-restraint standard, which was to provide a menu of options to
manufacturers that were deemed safe in a phase-in period. Installation
of airbags in all vehicles was one such option, but the other
sanctioned options were deemed safe as well. For those reasons, the
Levine dissent argued, the Geier Court had held that "the doctrine of
conflict pre-emption barred Geier's efforts to deem some of those
federally approved alternatives 'unsafe' under state tort law." 270 The
dissent then declared that Levine presented an identical issue, and
2 67

The main reason given by the Court was its refusal to grant deference to the regulation
for procedural flaws related to the FDA's failure to provide an opportunity for comment on the
broad preemption pronouncements included in the preamble. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187, 1201 (2009) ("The agency's views on state law are inherently suspect in light of this
procedural failure.").
2
Id. at 1203 (noting that at all times applicable to the case, the FDA's position was its
"traditional recognition of state-law remedies" (citation omitted)).
2 See id. at 1203-04 n.14.
27Od. at 1221 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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therefore the claims should have been preempted. 2 7 1 The dissent
stated: 'Through Phenergan's label, the FDA offered medical
professionals a menu of federally approved, 'safe' and 'effective'
alternatives-including IV push-for administering the drug.
Through a state tort suit, respondent attempted to deem IV push
'unsafe' and 'ineffective."'272
The dissent misapprehends an important point. While one might
say that the Phenergan label offered a sort of "menu" for health care
providers, the IV-push alternative was not safe in the way that the
Secretary of Transportation deemed the items on the passive-restraint
menu safe for purposes of the automobile phase-in. Indeed, the
IV-push delivery system presented significant safety concerns.
Further, prescription drug warnings for consumer safety implicate an
entirely different set of policies from the issues contemplated by the
Department of Transportation in establishing a plan to phase in
passive restraints over time.
What, then, remains of Geier's force? Geier remains an important,
if not exactly original,273 linchpin between express and implied
preemption in the unitary doctrine. But the analytical process used by
the Court and the conclusions reached were peculiar to the facts of the
case. The Levine Court demonstrated the importance of marginalizing
Geier to avoid elevating the result over the process. The Levine
dissent, on the other hand, demonstrated that preemption under the
unitary standard can be a slippery slope.
V. THE UNITARY STANDARD AND THE THREATENED EROSION OF THE
HEALTH AND SAFETY GOALS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW

A. Does Unitary Mean Standardless?
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment in Levine, expressed
the concern that the Court is on a slippery slope in its preemption
analysis. In commentary that focused on federalism, he stated: "[T]his
brand of the Court's pre-emption jurisprudence facilitates
freewheeling, extratextual, and broad evaluations of the 'purposes and
271See
272

27 3

id. ("The same rationale [as in Geier] applies here.").

Id.

In FreightlinerCorp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287-89 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court
conducted an implied preemption analysis after determining that the express preemption
provision in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 did not bar the
plaintiff's personal injury claims. The Court then held, with little analysis, that implied
preemption did not bar the claims. Id. at 289; see also discussion supra notes 48-56 and
accompanying text. In Geier,by contrast, a specific federal standard existed, one that embodied
a particular federal policy-to phase in passive restraints by offering a menu of options to motor
vehicle manufacturers. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co. 529 U.S. 861, 878-81 (2000).
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objectives' embodied within federal law. This, in turn, leads to
decisions giving improperly broad pre-emptive effect to judicially
manufactured policies, rather than to the statutory text enacted by
Congress . . . .,,274 Justice Thomas opined that the no-preemption
result reached by the Court in Levine was fully supported by the text
of the FDCA and that the Court did not need to speculate on the
relevance and meaning of matters outside the text, such as Congress's
decision not to include a preemption provision applicable to drugs
when it amended the statute.
Justice Thomas has long denounced this "purposes and objectives"
approach to preemption and has been generally critical of implied
preemption, particularly the "obstacle" type. While he has agreed
with the Court when it has taken a restrained approach to the use of
implied preemption,276 he has voiced concern that the Court's
277
preemption analysis is overly expansive, as evidenced by Geier. In
his concurrence in Bates, Justice Thomas raised a similar concern.
While praising the Court for declining to conduct an implied
preemption analysis after determining that the preemption provision
did not bar the claims, he expressed displeasure with the application
of implied preemption generally because, in his view, it could become
"'[a] freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in
tension with federal objectives.' 27 8 Justice Kennedy has also
expressed concern that the Court's preemption analysis has replaced
the intent of Congress with a "freewheeling judicial inquiry." 27 9 In the
same context, Justice Kennedy has stated the importance of the
presumption against preemption.28 0 Clearly, both Justices were
concerned that the Court would go too far in holding that federal
statutes preempt state rules, including common-law tort rules.

274Levine,

129 S. Ct. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
See id. at 1216.
276
See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 458 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Because we need only determine the ordinary
meaning of [the preemption provision], the majority rightly declines to address respondent's
argument that petitioners' claims are subject to other types of pre-emption.").
277See, e.g., Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1214 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("The Court's
decision in Geier to apply 'purposes and objectives' pre-emption based on agency comments,
regulatory history, and agency litigating positions was especially flawed, given that it conflicted
with the plain statutory text of the saving clause within the Safety Act, which explicitly
preserved state common-law actions .... ).
278Bates, 544 U.S. at 459 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
dissenting in part)) (alteration in original).
part and
279
See Gade, 505 U.S. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
mId. at 111-12 ("[W]e will not infer pre-emption of the States' historic police powers
absent a clear statement of intent by Congress." (citations omitted)).
275
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It is difficult, however, to imagine a preemption decision that does
not examine, at least to some degree, the broader purposes and goals
of the federal statute. Even in express preemption, the Court has held
that "Congress' intent must be divined from the language, structure,
and purposes of the statute as a whole."281 Where Congress has not
explicitly articulated those purposes, a multiplicity of factors may
provide the necessary information. United States v. Locke,282 which
involved a long statutory history, a complex federal-state relationship,
and textually unclear preemption provisions, is a perfect example.2 83
Under the unitary standard, the Court examines these factors when
deemed necessary using express preemption analysis, implied
preemption analysis, or both. But the approach encourages
arbitrariness. Will the Court apply the presumption against
preemption? If not, why not? Will the Court consider the saving
clause, or simply ignore it? If the Court considers it, how will it be
interpreted? Will the Court even conduct an express preemption
analysis or move directly to an implied preemption analysis?
In a particular case, the Court's approach to preemption may make
sense. For example, in Buckman, the Court all but ignored the
preemption provision, choosing instead to analyze the case only under
implied preemption. The Court held the plaintiffs fraud-on-the-FDA
claims preempted under implied conflict preemption because the
FDCA contained a detailed federal scheme 28 4 for addressing
fraudulent practices perpetrated against the FDA. 28 5 The Court
declined to conduct an express preemption analysis, despite the
existence of the preemption provision in the MDA. Rather, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated: "In light of this conclusion [that implied
preemption bars the claims], we express no view on whether these
claims are subject to express pre-emption under 21 U.S.C. § 360k."286
This approach suggests that the Buckman Court was following an ad
hoc unitary standard, according to which the high federal interest in a
federal agency policing itself allowed the Court to essentially choose
to resolve the case according to implied preemption and ignore the
express preemption provision.2 87 Using a loosely phrased conflict
preemption label, the Court merely said that allowing the state-law
fraud claims would disturb the "somewhat delicate balance of
281Id. at 112 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990); Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)).
28
529 U.S. 89 (2000).
283

See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-48 (2001).

4See supra

28

286Id. at
28

7 See

348 n.2.

Eggen, Shedding Light, supra note 11, at 162-63.
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statutory objectives" in the FDCA and the MDA. 2 8 8 This approach
made substantial sense in the narrow world of that case, considering
the extraordinarily high federal interest in the FDA's power to police
the entities that come before it for approval of medical devices and
drugs. As precedent, however, Buckman is more problematic.
The Court's unitary standard is a broad federalism approach that
attempts to strike the "delicate balance of statutory objectives"
referenced by the Court in Buckman. The risks of this approach are
substantial, as it turns each decision into an ad hoc federalism
analysis open to over-reliance on policy judgments and broad judicial
discretion. The Court respects certain important values, but discards
them just as easily when it serves its purpose. In Levine, Justice
Thomas objected that the Court has substituted "judicially
manufactured policies" for reasoned textual analysis.289 I would argue
that the Court is doing both, with inconsistent results. This approach
begs the question how far the product preemption doctrine has come
from its roots in the Supremacy Clause. 290
Despite these issues, the Court's approach to preemption is not
standardless. Far from it. It is instead suffering from a surfeit of
conflicting standards that are not applied in a uniform manner from
case to case. Thus, although the Court has standardized its approach
291
to express preemption to a large extent, circling around that hub of
certainty is a lack of predictability in individual cases. The more
troubling issue is that after decades of product preemption decisions
from the Supreme Court, the resulting unitary standard allows the
Court to choose the factors that it deems relevant in a manner that
could be handled arbitrarily and may vary depending on the
292
individual views of the Justice writing the opinion.
In cases involving consumer health and safety, the Court has often
used the unitary standard to reach decisions that have been in the best
interests of the consumer. But there is no guarantee of that result in
future cases, even those involving the same federal statute. Trial

mBuckman, 531 U.S. at 348.
2 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
mCf Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNEL L. REV. 767, 808
(1994) (arguing that preemption has nothing to do with the Supremacy Clause as a matter of
constitutional law and stating that preemption is "nothing more nor less than an instance of
ordinary legislative power").
29 See Eggen, Normalizationof Product Preemption,supra note 10, at 769-74 (discussing
the standardization of express preemption analysis in product preemption cases through Bates).
m Compare Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 (Stevens, J.) (discussing the benefits of tort
litigation), with Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (arguing that
juries are incapable of performing an adequate risk-benefit analysis of a product).
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courts are left with a confusing collection of rules, and consumers
may find the tort system unavailable for unpredictable reasons.
B. The Threat to the Role of Tort Law in Consumer Health and Safety
The Court has repeatedly stated its respect for the role of tort
litigation in the balance of health and safety objectives advanced by
federal law and state law. In so doing, the Court has emphasized some
of the important policies underlying tort law generally and product
liability law in particular. In CSX Transportation, Inc. v.
Easterwood,293 a non-product negligence case involving an accident
at a railroad crossing, the Court stated: "'[T]he scheme of negligence
liability could just as easily complement these regulations by
encouraging

railroads

. . . to provide

current and complete

information to the state agency responsible for determining priorities
294 In Bates, the Court stressed "the
for improvement projects ....
importance of providing an incentive to manufacturers to use the
utmost care in the business of distributing inherently dangerous
items.",29 5 And in Geier, the Court observed that "occasional
nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a system in which juries not
only create, but also enforce, safety standards, while simultaneously
providing necessary compensation to victims. That policy by itself
disfavors pre-emption, at least some of the time."296 In Levine, the
Court continued to recognize the deterrent value of state product
liability actions. Justice Stevens acknowledged the FDA's
information vacuum, stating:
The FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs
on the market, and manufacturers have superior access to
information about their drugs, especially in the postmarketing
phase as new risks emerge. State tort suits uncover unknown
drug hazards and provide incentives for drug manufacturers
to disclose safety risks promptly.297
Accordingly, the Court refused to grant deference to the FDA's 2006
preamble, which rejected a safety role for tort actions. 29 8

2 507 U.S. 658 (1993), superseded on other grounds by statute, Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266
2007)).
294
Id. at 668.
29 5
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 450 (2005).
2
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000).
297 Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 (footnote omitted).
2
's Id.
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As some scholars have noted, it is counterintuitive that the FDA
now takes the position that the deterrence role of state product
liability actions impairs the agency's work rather than assists it. 29 9
The explanation is likely political: the pro-business policy of the Bush
administration favored barring drug and medical device lawsuits. The
policy was based, in part, on the argument that strong warnings would
reduce consumer use of beneficial products, 3 which would be
detrimental to the industry. Mirroring this view, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Buckman, warned that
"unpredictable civil liability" could deter manufacturers from
developing and seeking FDA approval of new medical devices. 3 01
One would instead expect the federal agency entrusted with
marketing approval decisions for drugs and medical devices to
appreciate and benefit from the role of the states in bringing to light
information regarding the safety and effectiveness of the products. 302
On a fundamental level, tort litigation reflects the democratic ideal of
participation in the system, both by litigants as adversaries and by the
jury as the ultimate decision maker.303 By contrast, the FDA, in the
2006 preamble, has taken an elitist and arbitrary position in rejecting
any beneficial role for product liability suits. 304 The FDA's position
represents a broad and standardless approach to implied preemption.
The Court also has repeatedly acknowledged the remedial nature
of tort law in providing compensation to injured persons in areas of
federal regulation. A quarter century ago, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., the Court stated: "It is difficult to believe that Congress would,
without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those
injured by illegal conduct."30 5 Two decades later, in Bates, the Court
2

9See O'Steen & O'Steen, supranote 6, at 93-94.
"See Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25,
2004, at Al.
30 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
302
See Wagner, supra note 113, at 695 n.4 ("When regulatory decisions are made based
primarily on the politics of the executive branch, the tort system also offers an important
mechanism for outsiders to advance their preferred regulatory ends.").
303
See Allan Kanner, The Politics of Toxic Tort Law, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 163, 163-64
(1997) ("As a group, toxic tort cases demonstrate how legal norms governing responsibility for
the consequences of 'synthetic living' and technological failures reflect, in part, the conflict
between the democratic and elitist ideals extant in our legal system." (footnotes omitted));
Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion:A Model of Majoritarianismas Adjudication, 96 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1, 20-22 (2001) (arguing that participation is "central to democratic legitimacy"). Kanner
demonstrates that much of the tension in toxic tort litigation over the standards for scientific
evidence, preemption, appropriate case management, and information gathering and
dissemination may be explained by the tension between democratic and elitist ideals. Kanner,
supra, at 178-83.
3
nThis position is embodied in the 2006 preamble. See 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24,
2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
3ss Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).
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echoed that statement and cautioned that "[i]f Congress had intended
to deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it
surely would have expressed that intent more clearly." 306 in
Sprietsma, the Court said that "the concern with uniformity does not
justify the displacement of state common-law remedies that
compensate accident victims and their families and that serve the
Act's more prominent objective . . . of promoting ... safety." 3 07
The information vacuum in drug and medical device regulatory
matters is an urgent problem,308 but solutions have been slow to come.
In the meantime, and for the foreseeable future, 3 9 the FDA will be
hamstrung by
insufficient
resources,
sluggish regulatory
implementation, and institutional inadequacies. The inability of the
FDA to conduct a meaningful risk-utility balancing process for drugs
and devices on the market, as well as new applications, is seriously
impaired. The product preemption doctrine must not ignore this
reality in the way that it was ignored in Riegel.
The Court has recognized that tort law serves several valuable
purposes in our federalist system. Preemption rules shielding
manufacturers from lawsuits, in whole or in substantial part,310
countermand the health and safety role of tort law. Such rules defeat
the short-term goals of tort law by discouraging manufacturers from
altering or withdrawing unsafe products and by eliminating incentives
to make safety a priority in the development of new products. They
also inhibit the long-term goals by removing the incentive for
vigilance in the postmarket phase and eliminating compensation to
persons injured by defective products. Broadly shielding product
manufacturers from civil liability also prevents optimal information
gathering for the regulatory agency, physicians, and ultimately
consumers. Because the adversarial and deliberative process in court
is different from the process by which regulatory agencies collect and
consider information,1 the tort system is a beneficial adjunct in the
product arena. Proponents of extreme tort reform measures ignore the
necessary role of the tort system or are willing to trade it for a host of
3

o6Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
0o Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 70 (2002).
30 See supra notes 107-27 and accompanying text.
30See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
310Of course, Congress has sometimes enacted a blanket shield of an entire industry. See,
e.g., Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903 (2006) (granting
gun industry immunity from most tort lawsuits).
311See Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-MajoritarianThesis: The Case of Torts,
49 DEPAuL L. REv. 533, 533 (2000) ("[C]ourts tend to be populist and deliberative, whereas
legislatures tend to be captured by special interests, secretive, hasty, and unwilling or unable to
offer reasons for their actions.").
3
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other goals. Indeed, the zeal of the tort reformers reflects a
deep-seated distrust of the judicial system. 312 This distrust has placed
all the cards in the hands of the legislature-both Congress and state
legislatures-and has all too often resulted in no benefit to the

public.3 13
How does this debate impact the product preemption doctrine? The
unitary standard gives courts latitude to apply the doctrines of
preemption to achieve a result that reflects a certain predetermined
predilection.3 14 There is nothing to ensure a truly balanced approach
between consumer safety and the protection, or elevation, of business
interests. This configuration of the product preemption doctrine is not
optimal. One might argue that in Levine the Court achieved the
"right" result for consumers, applying the unitary standard. Or one
might point to Bates, in which the Court recognized that tort law
plays a useful role supplementary to certain legislative schemes,
stating: "FIFRA contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over
time, as manufacturers gain more information about their products'
performance in diverse settings."s31 The Court contemplated the role
of product liability actions in providing the necessary information.316
But the reality is that a doctrine of product preemption with
insufficient predictability could just as well lead to elimination of
consumer rights in future cases.
C. Considerationsfor the Future
The evolution of the product preemption doctrine has moved
slowly, and it is disappointing to have to conclude that little certainty
and predictability have found their way into the mature doctrine. This
Article has viewed the mature product preemption doctrine from the
point of view of consumer health and safety. The mature doctrine
jeopardizes consumer health and safety by permitting courts to
employ the implied preemption doctrine using a loose collection of
factors. In this sub-part, I identify some considerations that should
3

12
See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Public Nuisance Claims Against Gun
Sellers: New Insightsand Challenges,38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 54 (2004).
313
See John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1027, 1084 (2003) (arguing that legislative enactments shielding entire industries result in
"plaintiffs [being] forced to give up rights that seem required by ... principles of corrective
justice, and they gain nothing in return").
314
See Eggen, Sense or Sensibility, supra note 11, at 37 (discussing Lohr's analytical
process and stating that "the entire process is informed with policy decisions from start to
finish").
315Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005).
3'6 Id. (stating that "[p]rivate remedies that enforce federal misbranding requirements
would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA").
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direct the application of the doctrine in the future to make it more
predictable and to adequately reflect the health and safety concerns of
product law.
First, the presumption against preemption should guide the
analytical process in the courts, particularly when the state rule in
question is a common-law claim invoking the historic police powers
of the state. While the United States Supreme Court has discarded the
presumption in some cases in which it has concluded the federal
interest was high,317 in product liability cases the presumption should
receive primary consideration, whether the analysis is one of express
preemption or implied preemption. It sometimes seems that the Court
views the presumption against preemption as an absolute barrier to
preemption and resists its application for that reason. Perhaps this
resistance is because the Court has framed it as an "assumption,"
rather than a rebuttable presumption. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Co., in an often-quoted statement of the presumption, the Court
framed it as follows: "[W]e start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."3 18
Rather than simply rejecting the "assumption," the Court should treat
it as a source of guidance in which the degree of its relevance in a
particular case depends upon many factors, such as the extent of
federal interest in the subject matter of the case or the historical
relationship between state and federal law in the matters subject to
federal regulation. Enhanced respect for the presumption against
preemption, by mandating that courts address its applicability rather
than discard it without substantial discussion, would restore the
presumption to its role as the starting point for the preemption
analysis.
A second matter for future consideration is the role of the saving
clause, which has fluctuated throughout the Court's product
preemption jurisprudence. A saving clause can only be accurately
interpreted within the broader context of the federal statuteincluding a preemption provision if it contains one-and Congress's
purpose in establishing the federal scheme. This is exactly the
analysis conducted by the Court in Levine. After noting that the 1962
amendments to the FDCA added a saving clause," 9 the Court
discerned congressional intent from the circumstances surrounding
the long history of the FDCA against the background of state tort
317

See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-48 (2001); United
States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
316Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted).
319
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195-96 (2009).
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litigation. 32 0 The Court also deemed significant the fact that Congress
declined both to create a federal remedy for consumers and to add a
preemption provision to the statute. 3 2 1 The aggregate, the Court
concluded, "is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA
oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and
effectiveness." 3 22 A saving clause must be interpreted in this
comprehensive manner, where, as is typically the case, Congress has
not offered a full explanation of its intent in the text of the statute.
Even where the statutory text embodies a particular congressional
agenda, the harsh realities of the operation of the agency may render
that agenda impossible to achieve. The example of the FDA
demonstrates this point. Preemption under those circumstances places
consumers in double jeopardy.
Third, courts should shrink the role of implied preemption. Implied
preemption should be the exception, not the rule, in matters
traditionally relegated to the states. Justice Thomas has legitimate
federalism concerns with the use of implied preemption, concerns that
he articulated fully in his concurring opinion in Levine. As he argued,
federalism problems arise when courts "expand federal statutes
beyond their terms through doctrines of implied pre-emption."32 3 In
his view, such evidence as "Congressional and agency musings" does
not satisfy the requirements under the Supremacy Clause for
preemption.324 Rather, evidence in the "text and structure" of the
federal statute must be the focus. 3 25 While the ability to accurately
and comprehensively understand the meaning of the text and structure
of the federal statute may require an examination of its broader
320
321

322

1d. at 1199-1200.

Id.
Id. at 1200. I have addressed this point in some detail elsewhere, stating in part:

The saving clause presents a classic issue of checks and balances. When Congress,
using broad plain language, chooses to exempt common law claims from the
preemption clause, the common law may occasionally be in conflict with the
requirements and purposes of the federal statutory scheme. The doctrine of
preemption allows the courts to determine the extent to which nonconforming state
standards will be tolerated. That process will involve examining the unique
characteristics of the federal statute, as well as the relationship of the state standard
to the federal scheme.
Eggen, Normalizationof ProductPreemption,supra note 10, at 776.
323 Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1207 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
324

Id.
325Id. at 1207-08 (stating that "'[e]vidence of pre-emptive purpose [must be] sought in the

text and structure of the [p]rovision at issue"' (alterations in original) (quoting CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).
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context, efforts to limit an expansive use of implied preemption are
warranted.
Finally, there is a lesson in all this for Congress. In Riegel, the
Court stated: "Congress is entitled to know what meaning this Court
will assign to terms regularly used in its enactments. Absent other
indication, reference to a State's 'requirements' includes its
common-law duties."326 This is, in fact, the opposite of the way it
should be. Rather, Congress should provide the courts with a clear
meaning of the terms it regularly uses in its enactments, thus avoiding
judicial speculation. In reality, we do not know whether Congress
intends the term "requirements" to have the same meaning in
preemption provisions in statutes as diverse as those applicable to
medical devices and motor vehicles. Without clear direction from
Congress, it is all too easy for the courts to make errors. Going
forward, Congress must pay attention to these details and provide
some measure of clarity. Retrospectively, Congress may find it
advisable to revisit some of its enactments in light of the Court's
interpretation and correct errors where necessary.327
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's product preemption doctrine
has moved into its maturity with a triad of cases decided in 2008 and
2009. Product law holds consumer health and safety as a primary
goal. The Supreme Court has stated: "[B]ecause the States are
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed
that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of
action."32 8 Product liability actions serve several goals, including
providing an incentive to manufacturers to produce safe products and
to remain vigilant of new risks that may arise after the product is
approved for marketing. It is particularly important in the area of
medical devices and drugs that preemption not bar state tort actions,
as the FDA has been hindered by insufficient resources, particularly
in postmarket surveillance.
The new triad of decisions from the Supreme Court is a
double-edged sword. While the decisions provide some certainty,
particularly in the analytical process of express preemption, they
move the Court further in the direction of a unitary standard that lacks
a clear distinction between express and implied preemption and
3 26

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008).
e.g., Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009)
(proposing legislation to retroactively reverse the result in Riegeo.
328Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
327See,
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invites broad judicial discretion. The unitary standard runs the risk of
becoming a loose policy-laden analysis in which vague concepts of
conflict preemption are applied randomly, offering little
predictability. From the perspective of consumer protection in the
product arena, the unitary standard could be applied in a sweeping
fashion to eliminate many state product liability actions. Agency
failures, such as those experienced by the FDA due to underfunding
and other resource deficiencies, further place consumers in jeopardy.
Congress and the Supreme Court should take account of these
concerns to provide safety for consumers and predictability for
manufacturers, judges, and attorneys.

